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OF RIGHTS LOST AND GAINED
PATRICIA A. DORE*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the general election in November, 1978, Florida voters will
have the opportunity to consider and approve or reject revisions to
the state constitution proposed by the Constitution Revision Com-
mission. The commission's proposals will appear in eight separate
items on the ballot, with the bulk of the proposed changes in the
first ballot item.' Seven so-called "controversial" proposals will be
voted on separately, in order to give the electorate an effective voice
in the major policy decisions encompassed by each of those propos-
als. Voters will be given the opportunity to determine whether re-
sponsibility for reapportionment should be removed from the legis-
lature and vested in a nonpartisan, appointed reapportionment
commission;2 whether the elected Cabinet should be eliminated;3
whether the elected Public Service Commission should be replaced
with an appointed one; 4 whether the judicial retention system based
on merit should be extended to include circuit court and county
court judges;5 whether the Governor and Cabinet should be replaced
as the State Board of Education by a lay board appointed by the
Governor;' whether sex should be included with race, religion, and
physical handicap in article I, section 2;1 and whether the recom-
* Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law. B.A. 1966, Carlow College;
J.D. 1969, Duquesne University; LL.M. 1970, Yale University. The author served as principal
staffperson for the Declaration of Rights, and Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committees and
as a staffperson for the Style and Drafting Committee of the Constitution Revision Commis-
sion.
1. Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const., Ballot Packages & Ballot Language, Revision No. 1 (May
11, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Ballot Packages]. This item contains all proposed changes to
the following articles except those appearing as separate ballot items: article I (declaration
of rights), article II (general provisions), article I (legislature), article IV (executive), article
V (judiciary), article VI (suffrage and elections), article VIII (local government), article X
(miscellaneous), article XI (amendments), and article XII (schedule).
2. Id. at Revision No. 3 (revision of art. III, § 16, legislative) (single-member districts and
Reapportionment Commission).
3. Id. at Revision No. 4 (revision of art. IV, §§ 1(g), 3-6, 8(a); art. XI, § 2, executive
(cabinet)); see Johnson, supra this issue; Moyle, supra this issue.
4. Ballot Packages, supra note 1, at Revision No. 5 (revision of art. IV, § 10; art. V, §
3(b)(3), executive (Public Service Commission and Public Counsel)).
5. Id. at Revision No. 6 (revision of art. V, §§ 10, 11(a)-(b), judiciary (selection and
retention of circuit and county judges)).
6. Id. at Revision No. 8 (revision of art. IX, education); see Draper, A New Look for Public
Education: The Proposed Revision of Florida's Education Governance System, infra this
issue.
7. Ballot Packages, supra note 1, at Revision No. 2 (revision of art. I, § 2, declaration of
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mended finance and taxation package should be approved.'
This is the first time that Florida voters will consider recommen-
dations for constitutional revision that have not been approved first
by their legislature.' Thus the electorate has a unique opportunity
to express directly its sentiments on such important issues of gov-
ernment structure as the elected Cabinet, the composition of the
State Board of Education, and the advisability of a reapportion-
ment commission. Certainly the Constitution Revision Commis-
sion's proposals in the government structure area are daring. In-
deed, if all of them are approved by the people, the political face of
the state will be altered dramatically. For this reason, the commis-
sion's final product might well be characterized as a structural re-
form of state government.
But the commission's work and its work product reflect another
theme equally daring and potentially more significant than the
structural reform measures in its impact on the quality of life in the
state over the next twenty years. The commission was intensely
concerned about the protection of individual rights. Its recommen-
dations for the revision of article I reflect the depth of its commit-
ment to the preservation of human liberty and individual freedom.
Such interests and concerns were no doubt fueled both by the times
and by the personalities of many of the commissioners. The com-
mission's deliberations began at a time when human rights were
being emphasized in both domestic and foreign policy and when the
pride and good feelings engendered by the bicentennial were still
running high. 10 As a people, we were more knowledgeable about the
uniqueness of our system of government, more intimate with the
high ideals espoused by the framers of our national Constitution,
more willing to believe again in the noble venture they initiated, and
secure enough to participate more generously in the unparalleled
rights (sex)); see Note, One Small Word: Sexual Equality Through the State Constitution,
infra this issue.
8. Ballot Packages, supra note 1, at Revision No. 7 (revision of art. VII; art. X, § 12(h),
finance and taxation); see Greenfield, Flexibility and Fiscal Conservatism: Provisions of the
1978 Constitutional Revision Relating to Bond Financing, infra this issue; Wall, Homestead
and the Process of History: The Proposed Changes in Article X, Section 4, infra this issue;
Note, Ad Valorem Taxation of Leasehold Interests in Governmentally Owned Property, infra
this issue; Note, Defining a Fair Share: The Proposed Revision to Florida's Corporate Profits
Tax, infra this issue; Note, The False Promise of Homeowner Tax Relief, infra this issue.
9. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2, providing for the creation of a Constitution Revision Commis-
sion and providing that its recommendations be submitted directly to the secretary of state,
was added to the constitution in 1968. D'Alemberte, Commentary, in 26A FLA. STAT. ANN.
548 (West 1970); Sturm, The Procedure of State Constitutional Change-With Special Em-
phasis on the South and Florida, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 569 (1977).
10. See D'Alemberte, Constitution Revision Symposium: Introduction, 5 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 565 (1977).
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effort to free the human spirit than at any time in our recent history.
It was a time, too, when there was a resurgence of interest in state
constitutions as sources of rights for the individual." It is not with-
out significance that reprints of Justice William Brennan's Harvard
Law Review article, State Constitutions and the Protection of Indi-
vidual Rights, were distributed to the commissioners by Commis-
sion Chairman Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte. 1
D'Alemberte was particularly concerned about and dedicated to
the extension of individual rights beyond the minimum required by
the Federal Constitution. He introduced and managed on the floor
a proposal amending article I, section 1 to provide that "[rights
guaranteed by this constitution are not dependent on those guaran-
teed by the United States Constitution."' 3 The purpose of this be-
guilingly simple proposal was to breathe new life into the declara-
tion of rights of the Florida Constitution. It was to remind the bench
and the bar that federal constitutional rights are only minimum
guarantees. They do not exhaust the possibilities for human free-
dom. It was to remind the courts and the legislature that the rights
which Floridians have enshrined in their constitution are not neces-
sarily coextensive with nor as limited as the rights they enjoy as
Americans by virtue of the Federal Constitution.
D'Alemberte's appointment of Commissioners Dempsey Barron,
LeRoy Collins, Dexter Douglass, and Jon Moyle-all skilled and
vocal advocates of individual rights-to committees responsible for
developing proposed revisions to article I was without doubt a most
significant factor. Of course, it took more than the efforts of these
five men to imbue the final product with the stamp of individual
rights. It took a commission composed of thirty-seven women and
men with open minds and sensitive consciences to hear and to re-
spond. Still, those five men were, in most instances, the initiators,
11. Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH. L. REv. 454 (1970); Falk,
Foreword: The State Constitution: A More Than 'Adequate' Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF.
L. REv. 273 (1973); Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and the Need for a
Renaissance, 3 VAL. U.L. REv. 125 (1969); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights
in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976); Project Report: Toward an Activist
Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 271 (1973); Note, Of Laboratories
and Liberties: State Court Protection of Political and Civil Rights, 10 GA. L. REv. 533 (1976);
Note, Rediscovering the California Declaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 481 (1974); Note,
The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN.
L. REv. 297 (1977).
12. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 489 (1977).
13. Fla. C.R.C., Proposal 185, adopted by a 30-0 vote, 19 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 288 (Jan. 12,
1978). The proposal was derived from CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24. See Transcript of Fla. C.R.C.
proceedings 145-46 (Jan. 12, 1978) (remarks of Sandy D'Alemberte).
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the floor managers, and the principal spokesmen for the proposals
concerning individual rights. Their contributions to the success of
the venture should not and cannot be minimized.
Nor should the appearances and testimony of concerned citizens
be minimized. At public hearings around the state, citizens from all
walks of life pressed individual rights issues before the commission.
Perhaps the most eloquent statement was made in the keynote ad-
dress delivered on the opening day of commission proceedings by
Chesterfield Smith:
First, I believe that our Constitution must contain an enhanced
and enriched Bill of Rights which, in addition to guaranteeing to
all of our citizens their traditional personal and property rights,
must also address and embrace the quality of life to the extent that
Floridians have come in recent times to understand to be their
minimum entitlement. Truly, we are in the age of enhanced citizen
participation in law-making - in rule making - in governmental
decision making at all levels. It is the age of the unrepresented and
the under-represented, the age of the women, the consumers, the
environmentalists, the aliens, the physically and mentally disa-
bled, the poor and the ethnic minorities. It is the age of ethics and
openness and honesty for all public officials. Perhaps these immut-
able principles, often heretofore ignored in the Bill of Rights too,
should now be embedded in Florida in Constitutional concrete."
This article examines the commission's response to this challenge.
II. VENTURED BUT NOT GAINED
Not every request for constitutional redress from "the unrepre-
sented and the under-represented" received commission approval.
The commission heard 800 suggestions for revision from members
of the public testifying at public hearings conducted around the
state. The commission itself then reduced the 800 suggestions to 232
issues it was interested in pursuing. A total of 258 proposals were
actually introduced. Probably less than half that number were
adopted.
This section discusses five proposals which were not approved for
inclusion in the final revision document. The commission or one of
. its committees rejected proposals guaranteeing indigent persons
access to the state courts without regard to their ability to pay fees
and costs, guaranteeing certain rights for the mentally handi-
14. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 37 (July 6, 1977). Chesterfield Smith was chair-
man of the 1965 Constitution Revision Commission.
19781
614 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:609
capped, guaranteeing all citizens the right to a clean and healthful
environment, guaranteeing juveniles the full panoply of procedural
protections available to the criminally accused adult, and guar-
anteeing the media greater leeway to report on events of general
public concern without liability for defamation. In each instance,
the commission either declined to go farther than the Federal Con-
stitution required, or it declined to establish new state constitu-
tional rights not now recognized in the Federal Constitution.
An examination of these ill-fated proposals is useful for the in-
sight it provides to the process of revising a state constitution. In
addition, it may encourage judicial and legislative responses to
problems which the commission viewed as inappropriate subjects
for constitutional redress at this time. In any event, an analysis of
the unsuccessful efforts is necessary if a complete picture of the
commission's efforts to improve the climate for individual freedom
in this state is to be presented.
A. Access to Courts and the Ability to Pay
The Federal Constitution contains no specific provision guar-
anteeing access to the courts. Nevertheless, the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment does impose some limitations on state
power to regulate and control such access. In Boddie v. Connecticut,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that a state's conditioning
the bringing of an action for divorce on the payment of a filing fee
and costs for service of process denied indigent persons due process
of law. 15 The Boddie holding was extremely narrow, resting as it did
on the fundamental nature of the marriage relationship and the
state monopolization of the process by which that relationship could
be altered." Indeed, the Court expressly disclaimed any intention
to decide that access to the courts was itself a right so fundamental
that "its exercise may not be placed beyond the reach of any indi-
vidual .
Efforts to extend the principles of Boddie to challenge statutory
requirements that a filing fee be paid before one's debts could be
15. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
16. Id. at 374.
17. Id. at 382-83. Justice Douglas concurred in the result but based his conclusion on the
equal protection clause: "Affluence does not pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause
for determining who must remain married and who shall be allowed to separate." Id. at 386.
Justice Brennan rejected the significance attached by the majority to the state's control over
the divorce process, stating that he saw "no constitutional distinction between appellants'
attempt to enforce this state statutory right and an attempt to vindicate any other right
arising under federal or state law." Id. at 387 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
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discharged in bankruptcy'" or before one could appeal an adverse
administrative decision on eligibility for welfare benefits" were una-
vailing. In both instances, the Court distinguished Boddie and made
clear that the due process clause would operate to guarantee access
to the courts only when loss or impairment of a fundamental interest
was at stake as a consequence of financial inability to participate
in a process required by state law.20 Thus, as a matter of federal
constitutional law, access to the courts is not itself a protected inter-
est. A person must be seeking the protection or vindication of an
interest recognized as fundamental by the Court before the due
process clause will prohibit a state from demanding payment of an
admission fee.2'
Unlike the Federal Constitution, the Florida Constitution specifi-
cally addresses access to courts: "The courts shall be open to every
person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial or delay."2
However, in a 1974 case involving access to courts in an adop-
tion proceeding, the Florida Supreme Court looked chiefly to fede-
ral constitutional law rather than to the state constitution for guid-
ance.2 3 When Helen Grissom, an indigent widow whose only source
of income was Social Security, sought to adopt a child she had been
caring for since 1959, she was faced with paying between twenty-five
and thirty dollars to publish notice of the proceeding." Relying on
Boddie v. Connecticut 5 the Florida Supreme Court held that this
statutory method of obtaining jurisdiction over the natural mother,
whose whereabouts were unknown,"' was unconstitutional in its
application to indigents. According to the court, the right to have
children either naturally or by adoption is as fundamental as the
right to marry. Furthermore, the court found that by statute the
state had created an exclusive judicial procedure which had to be
18. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
19. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
20. Id. at 659; 409 U.S. at 445.
21. In addition to marriage, other fundamental interests include: voting (Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965)); travel (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)); privacy (Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)); childrear-
ing (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923));
procreation (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
22. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21. A provision guaranteeing access to courts has been included
in every constitution since 1838. See FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST. of 1861, art.
I, § 9; FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. I, § 4. See also Note, Article
I, Section 21: Access to Courts in Florida, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv 871 (1977).
23. Grissom v. Dade County, 293 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1974).
24. Id. at 60.
25. Id. at 63.
26. FLA. STAT. §§ 49.011(10), .10 (1977).
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used before the right to adoption could be realized. Since Ms. Gris-
som was unable to pay the publication cost, she was unable to
invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court, the forum required by
state law," to resolve a matter of fundamental importance-the
adoption of a child. Application of the publication requirement
under those circumstances denied Ms. Grissom due process and
equal protection of the law. 2
The Grissom opinion contained one passing reference to the state
constitutional guarantee of open courts 29 and briefly noted that Ms.
Grissom was "precluded from our courts because she [could not]
'purchase jurisdiction' over the wayward natural mother."0 Al-
though resolution of the issue under the access to courts provision
would have been appropriate, 1 the court virtually ignored that sec-
tion of the state constitution. Particularly troublesome is the possi-
bility that after Grissom, the requirements expressed in Boddie
are the applicable standard under the state, as well as the federal,
constitution. It is unclear from the Grissom opinion whether the
publication requirement was held invalid under the state constitu-
tion or under the Federal Constitution.32 Given the almost com-
plete reliance on Boddie, however, Grissom is best considered a
fourteenth amendment case. Since the Grissom court clearly did
not construe the access to courts section in the Florida Constitu-
tion, the conclusion that access to courts, as a matter of state con-
stitutional law, is as limited as the federal requirement would ap-
pear to be erroneous. 33
27. FLA. STAT. § 63.102 (1977) vests exclusive jurisdiction of adoptions in the circuit
courts.
28. 293 So. 2d at 61, 63.
29. The opinion set forth the following quotation from Rainey v. Rainey, 38 So. 2d 60 (Fla.
1948):
".. . In a democratic society like ours the administration of justice is not a chattel
or commodity of the bar that it may traffic or barter with ad libitum. It is an
attribute of sovereignty clothed with a vital public interest and we are commanded
to administer it without 'sale, denial or delay'. Section 4, Declaration of Rights,
Constitution of Florida, F.S.A."
293 So. 2d at 61. The court did not mention that a similarly worded provision is contained in
art. I, § 21 of the 1968 constitution.
30. 293 So. 2d at 61.
31. See Brief for Appellant at 20-22, Grissom v. Dade County, 293 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1974).
32. In phrasing the issue to be resolved, the court said that the question was whether
sections 49.011(10) and 49.10, Florida Statutes,'were "unconstitutional as applied to indigent.
persons, under the due process and equal protection provisions of the State and Federal
Constitutions." 293 So. 2d at 61. The court's conclusion is equally ambiguous: "The publica-
tion statutes are therefore unconstitutional as applied and the State should be required to
pay the costs of publication in such cases as these." Id. at 63.
33. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights Committee Minutes 6 (Oct. 13, 1977) (remarks of
Robert F. Williams representing Florida Legal Services, Inc.).
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Believing that the state of the law regarding access to the state's
courts was inadequate," Florida Legal Services, Inc. submitted two
proposals to amend section 21 to the Constitution Revision Commis-
sion." The proposals were considered by the Declaration of Rights
Committee"0 on two occasions.37 Commissioners Dempsey Barron
and Dexter Douglass both considered the subject matter inappro-
priate for a constitutional amendment, arguing that relief should be
sought from the legislature. 8 One proposal read: "No indigent per-
son shall be denied access to any court in any proceeding because
of inability to pay statutory fees and costs."39 A motion to approve
a proposal amending section 21 by inserting this language as a sec-
ond sentence was defeated on a tie vote.
Commissioner Jesse McCrary filed a proposal which would have
added "[n]o person shall be denied access to any court because of
inability to pay statutory fees" as a second sentence to section 21.40
McCrary's proposal was temporarily passed. Thus, the commission
did not debate the issue."
Although the committee's refusal to recommend the requested
change to section 21 doubtless was disappointing to the sponsors,
there likely will be no long-range impact from this refusal on judicial
construction of that section. Since Grissom did not construe the
state constitutional access to courts provision, that little-used sec-
tion 2 remains available to support a holding that access to the
34. Memorandum from Robert F. Williams to Governor LeRoy Collins, re: Article I,
Section 21, and Access to Court for Indigents (Oct. 6, 1977).
35. One proposal would have amended § 21 by inserting the following new language at
the end of the provision: "The legislature shall provide by general law for the waiver of
statutory fees and costs for insolvent persons in any proceedings before any court." As an
alternative, a self-executing proposal was submitted which would have amended § 21 by
inserting this new language at the end of the provision: "No insolvent person shall be denied
access to any court in any proceeding because of inability to pay statutory fees and costs."
36. This committee was chaired by former Governor LeRoy Collins and included Commis-
sioners Dempsey Barron, Dexter Douglass, Freddie Groomes, Richard Moore, and Jon Moyle.
Charlotte Hubbard, alternate commissioner, was also a member of the committee.
37. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights Committee Minutes 6 (Oct. 13, 1977); id. at4 (Nov.
14, 1977).
38. Id. at 6 (Oct. 13, 1977); id. at 4 (Nov. 14, 1977). Concern also was expressed about
use of the phrase "insolvent person." At Chairman Collins' request, the author redrafted the
self-executing proposal, supra note 35, substituting "indigent person" for "insolvent person."
Memorandum from Patricia Dore to the Declaration of Rights Committee, re: Article I,
Section 21 (Nov. 14, 1977).
39. Commissioners Groomes, R. Moore, and Collins voted in favor of the motion. Commis-
sioners Barron, Douglass, and Moyle voted against the motion. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of
Rights Committee Minutes 4 (Nov. 14, 1977).
40. Fla. C.R.C., Proposal 247.
41. See Fla. C.R.C., Calendar 3 (Jan. 27, 1978).
42. See Note, Article I, Section 21: Access to Courts in Florida, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 871
(1977).
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courts is itself so fundamental in Florida that "its exercise may not
be placed beyond the reach of any individual," 3 no matter how
poor.
B. Rights of the Mentally Handicapped
Two members of the Human Rights Advocacy Committee for
Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee" appeared before the Dec-
laration of Rights Committee to urge approval of two proposals
concerning rights of the mentally handicapped. The first proposal
would have amended the last sentence of article I, section 2 by
inserting the words "or mental" after the word "physical," so that
the sentence would read: "No person shall be deprived of any right
because of race, religion, or physical or mental handicap.",
Several commissioners raised questions about the reach of such a
provision." Arguably, statutory provisions providing for the ap-
pointment of a guardian to manage the affairs of a person declared
mentally incompetent47 and providing for involuntary commit-
ment 18 would be unconstitutional under the proposal. It was con-
tended that the only rights which the proposal would safeguard for
the mentally handicapped were those which the person was in fact
qualified to exercise. This argument was based on certain federal
regulations designed to implement a federal rehabilitation act. 9
Although the committee seemed sympathetic to the plight of men-
tally handicapped persons, the proper forum for relief was seen as
legislative rather than constitutional.2
The second proposal would have created a new section in article
I providing protections for the mentally handicapped closely paral-
leling the rights of accused persons.5 Consideration of this proposal
43. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971).
44. Phil Southerland, Associate Professor at Florida State University College of Law, and
Winsor Schmidt, Assistant Professor at Florida State University Institute for Social Research,
are members of the Hum'an Rights Advocacy Committee which was established pursuant to
FLA. STAT. § 20.19(7) (1977).
45. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights Committee Minutes 2 (Nov. 14, 1977).
46. Id. at 3.
47. FLA. STAT. § 744.331 (1977).
48. Id. § 394.467; see Note, The Confinement of Mabel Jones: Is There a Right to Jury
Trial in Civil Commitment Proceedings?, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. Rzv. 103 (1978).
49. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights Committee Minutes 3 (Nov. 14, 1977). Douglass
expressed his doubt that the federal regulations referred to by Mr. Schmidt would be useful
precedent for limiting state constitutional language. Id.
50. Id.
51. Any person subject to involuntary civil commitment proceedings shall, upon
demand be informed of the nature and cause of the allegations against him, shall
be furnished a copy of the allegations, and shall have the right to have compulsory
process for witnesses, to confront at hearing adverse witnesses, to be heard in
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provided the occasion for a wide-ranging discussion of the care and
treatment of persons committed to state psychiatric institutions.
But perhaps because the problems raised were so complex or be-
cause the committee was not prepared properly," this discussion
ended with rejection of the proposal and a recommendation that
relief be pursued in the legislature. 3
C. Right to a Clean and Healthful Environment
Among the subjects members of the public asked the commission
to address in the constitution was a right to a clean and healthful
environment. 4 The commission agreed to consider the question55
and the issue was referred to the Declaration of Rights Committee
for study.5
In recent years several states have added provisions to their con-
stitutions which address environmental interests. 5 These state con-
stitutional provisions fall generally into two categories: (1) broad
policy statements, and (2) recognition of individual rights relating
to the environment. 8 Twelve state constitutions 9 have policy state-
person, by counsel or both, and to have a speedy and public hearing by impartial
jury in the county where the allegations arise.
No person shall be compelled in any involuntary civil commitment proceeding to
be a witness against himself nor twice put in jeopardy of such commitment based
upon the same facts or circumstances. No person shall be subject to indefinite
involuntary commitment.
Any person involuntarily committed to any mental institution shall have the right
to receive such individual treatment as will give that person a realistic opportunity
to be cured or to improve his mental condition, by the least drastic means, and with
informed consent by that person, or if incompetent, by his guardian.
Id. at 2-3.
52. Since these proposals originated from a source outside the commission, no staff work
had been requested or performed. The oral presentations were not accompanied by any
written materials, save the language considered for inclusion in the constitution.
53. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights Committee Minutes 4 (Nov. 14, 1977).
54. Fla. C.R.C., Summary of Proposed Revisions to the Florida Constitution 1, 7 (Sept.
27, 1977) (suggestions submitted by the public) [hereinafter cited as Suggestions].
55. Fla. C.R.C., Constitution Revision Commission Issue List (List of 232) 27 (Sept. 28,
1977) [hereinafter cited as List of 232].
56. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights Committee Minutes 1-2 (Oct. 4, 1977).
57. See Tobin, Some Observations on the Use of State Constitutions to Protect the
Environment, 3 ENv. AFFAms 473 (1974); Note, A Proposal for Revision of the Florida Consti-
tution: Environmental Rights for Florida Citizens, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 809 (1977).
58. Memorandum from Patricia Dore to the Declaration of Rights Committee, re: Right
to Clean and Healthful Environment (Oct. 10, 1977).
59. ALASKA CONST. art VIII; FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 7; GA. CONST. art. III, § 8; HAWAII CONST.
art X; IDAHO CONST. art VIII, § 3A; LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52; MONT.
CONST. art. IX; N.M. CONST. art XX, § 21; N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4; N.C. CONST. art XIV,
§ 5; VA. CONST. art. XI.
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ments similar to the provision added to the Florida Constitution in
1968: "It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its
natural resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be
made by law for the abatement of air and water pollution and of
excessive and unnecessary noise."6 However, five states have con-
stitutional provisions which extend substantive environmental
rights to their citizens." Since Florida's constitution already con-
tains a statement of policy on the environment, the question under
consideration by the commission was whether that statement ought
to be strengthened by creating an individually enforceable right.
The committee debated the issue at two meetings and, within the
space of one week, completely changed its position. Initially, with
very little discussion, the committee approved a proposal offered by
Moyle 2 which was derived from the Illinois Constitution. 3 At its
next meeting, the committee voted to reconsider the vote by which
it approved Moyle's proposal. The committee's earlier action had
caught the attention of the business community, which was well
represented at the second meeting.64 It was suggested that the Moyle
proposal might be viewed as anti-business. 5 Grave concerns were
voiced that a constitutional right stated in absolute terms would
prohibit the legislature and the courts from taking into account the
societal benefits derived from an activity which might also injure a
single individual's right to a clean and healthful environment.
Moyle argued to no avail that his proposal did not grant an absolute
right, nor did it tie the hands of the legislature and the courts. He
referred specifically to the last sentence, which provided: "Each
60. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7.
61. ILL. CONST. art XI, § 2; MASS. CONST. art. XLIX (1780, amended 1918); PA. CONST.
art. I, § 27; R.I. CONST. art I, § 17 (1843, amended 1970) (amend. XXXVII); TEx. CONST. art
XVI, § 59(a).
62. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights Committee Minutes 5-6 (Oct. 13, 1977). The motion
approved the amendment of article II, § 7 to read:
The public policy of the state and the duty of each person is to provide and main-
tain a healthful environment, to conserve and protect its natural resources and
scenic beauty and to abate air and water pollution and excessive and unnecessary
noise for the benefit of this and future generations. The Legislature shall provide
by law for the implementation and enforcement of this public policy. Each person
has the right to a healthful environment. Each person may enforce this right against
any party, governmental or private, through appropriate legal proceedings subject
to reasonable limitation and regulation as the Legislature may provide by law.
63. Id. at 5.
64. Jon Shebel, representing Associated Industries of Florida, and Wade Hopping, repre-
senting CF Industries, ITT Community Development, and General Development Corpora-
tion, both addressed the committee at its Oct. 20, 1977 meeting. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of
Rights Committee Minutes 2, 6 (Oct. 20, 1977).
65. Id. at 3.
66. Id. at 2 (remarks of Wade Hopping); Id. at 6 (remarks of Jon Shebel).
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person may enforce this right against any party, governmental or
private, through appropriate legal proceedings subject to reasonable
limitation and regulation as the Legislature may provide by law."67
Having rescinded its earlier approval of the Moyle proposal, the
committee then approved Douglass' motion to move the existing
natural resources and scenic beauty provision from article H into
article I." Moyle's second and third attempts to gain committee
approval of a right to a clean and healthful environment were also
unsuccessful."5 In a startling turnaround, the committee then unani-
mously approved Douglass' motion to insert the following new lan-
guage as the opening sentence to the natural resources provision:
"The people of this state have a right to a clean and healthful
environment."70
The intense committee debate between business interests and
environmentalists proved to be an accurate foreshadowing of what
was to follow when the issue was debated by the full commission.
After Collins presented the committee's proposal, Moyle offered as
an amendment the modified Illinois provision he offered and lost
before the committee." Moyle explained that his amendment was
designed to avoid the extensive litigation which possibly would fol-
low if the committee's proposal were approved. Unlike the commit-
67. Id. at 2-3.
68. Id at 3.
69. Moyle moved to strike the existing language of former art. II, § 7 and insert the
following, id. at 6:
The public policy of the state and the duty of each person is to provide and main-
tain a clean and healthful environment, to conserve and protect its natural re-
sources, scenic beauty, to abate air and water pollution, excessive and unnecessary
noise for the benefit of this and future generations. Each person shall have the right
to a clean and healthful environment. The Legislature shall provide by law for the
implementation and enforcement of this public policy.
The motion was defeated on a tie vote. Id. at 7. Moyle then tried his hand at amending
another section of article I. He moved that § 2 be amended by inserting "and to a clean and
healthful environment" after the word "property," so that the section would read: "All
natural persons are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among which are the
right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry,
to acquire, possess and protect property and to a clean and healthful environment .... "
Barron offered but later withdrew an amendment adding "with economic stability" after
"environment." The motion by Moyle was defeated by a 2-4 vote. Id.
70. Id. The committee's environmental recommendation became Proposal 34. The com-
mittee voted to delete the treason provision in art. I, § 20. Id. at 2. When it then voted to
recommend the relocation of the natural resources and scenic beauty provision from art. II,
§ 7 to art. I, it recommended placement in the now vacant section. This put Proposal 34 in
an unusual posture for floor debate, in that three quite distinct issues were encompassed in
the one proposal: deletion of the treason provision, transfer of the existing natural resources
and scenic beauty provision, and recognition of the right to a clean and healthful environ-
ment.
71. See note 62 supra.
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tee proposal, which simply recognized a right to a clean and health-
ful environment, Moyle's amendment also authorized the legisla-
ture to restrict and regulate the enforcement of that right reason-
ably.712
Commissioner John Mathews offered as a substitute amendment:
"Everyone has a right to all the rights of Utopia."73 The substitute,
which he ultimately withdrew, enabled Mathews to pinpoint in dra-
matic fashion the problem he found with the original proposal and
with the Moyle amendment-"out of real good motivation and out
of lofty ideals we are trying to put something that is not practical
and won't work into the constitution."" He believed that the policy
statement alone, added to the constitution in 1968, was serving well.
Authorizing individuals, who might disagree with that assessment,
to sue would benefit no one but lawyers, argued Mathews.75
Several commissioners were concerned with the extent to which
Moyle's amendment might authorize not only governmental but
private interference with personal liberty. They raised the specter
of a person with habits that another found obnoxious (such as cigar
smoking, screaming, or expectorating tobacco juice), who would be
liable to suit for failing to meet the affirmative duties specified.
Moyle found no more support for his approach with the full commis-
sion than he had with the committee. His amendment was defeated
on a voice vote.77
Commissioner Don Reed offered an amendment to the original
proposal which qualified the newly created right by specifying that
it be "consistent with economic and social considerations." 8 This
72. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 13-14 (Jan. 10, 1978) (remarks of Jon Moyle).
73. Id. at 15 (remarks of John Mathews).
74. Id. at 16.
75. Id. at 15-16. Mathews, of course, is a lawyer himself.
76. Id. at 20-21 (remarks of John Mathews and Don Reed). Interference with the use of
property was suggested also. Id. at 25-26 (remarks of Elliott Messer).
77. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 27 (Jan. 10, 1978).
78. Don Reed's amendment struck the period after the word "environment" and inserted
"consistent with economic and social considerations." It also inserted "shall" after the word
"state." With the Reed amendment, the first sentence read: "The people of this state shall
have a right to a clean and healthful environment consistent with economic and social consid-
erations." A memorandum dated Nov. 7, 1977, to Jon Shebel and Ron Spencer from Robert
Rhodes, recited that "[a] major concern of the business community with [the committee
proposal] is that the self-executing right does not necessarily include a balancing of environ-
mental and -economic factors." Rhodes suggested that the second sentence should be
amended to read: "It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural
resources and scenic beauty consitent [sic] with reasonable economic development." (Em-
phasis in original.) It would seem that inserting the balancing language in the first sentence
which creates the right, as Reed's amendment did, would be more likely to achieve the results
sought by. Rhodes than his own suggested amendment. Arguably, implementation of the
policy by the legislature would be restricted by the reasonable economic development require-
ment, while the people's right to a clean and healthful environment would not.
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approach was resisted strenuously by Collins on the theory that it
unnecessarily cluttered and fundamentally weakened the proposal.
In Collins' view the logic behind Don Reed's amendment would
require .extensive modification and limitation throughout the decla-
ration of rights. For instance, the right to be rewarded for industry79
should carry a proviso that the industry not unduly pollute the
environment; the right to acquire, protect, and possess propertyl °
should be limited to property uses which are not in any manner
deleterious to the public interest;' the right to pursue happiness 2
should contain an exception for those persons who are incarcer-
ated.8
But, in the final analysis, it was probably the following remarks
of noted environmentalist and conservationist Commissioner Na-
thaniel Reed that doomed both Don Reed's amendment and the
original proposal:
We have a proven record of progress. If not spectacular, it is cer-
tainly one of the outstanding records in this country. We have the
ability for citizens organizations to sue. We have a legislature that
has given law and money to start departments that are effectively
monitoring and enforcing the rules ....
We are second to none. . . . I believe in staying with the win-
ning team. The present language in the constitution is enough to
guide us for the next 20 years safely and well without getting into
the very difficult court decisions that your amendment would raise
on top of their proposal."
Don Reed's amendment was defeated on a voice vote. Proposal
34 then was defeated overwhelmingly by a vote of six to twenty-
five.86
The following day, on motion of Nat Reed, the commission recon-
sidered the vote by which Proposal 34 failed, 7 approved by voice
vote an amendment striking the first sentence of the proposal, 8 and
then adopted Proposal 34 as amended by a vote of twenty-seven to
four.89
79. FLA. CONST. art I, § 2.
80. Id.
81. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 41 (Jan. 10, 1978) (remarks of LeRoy Collins).
82. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
83. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 30 (Jan. 10, 1978) (remarks of LeRoy Collins).
84. Id. at 39.
85. Id. at 42.
86. 17 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 262 (Jan. 10, 1978).
87. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 9 (Jan. 11, 1978).
88. 18 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 278 (Jan. 11, 1978).
89. Id.
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The net result of this lengthy and sometimes stormy process was
that the precatory statement on natural resources and scenic beauty
thought inadequate by some commentators to meet the pressures of
increased growth"0 remains essentially unchanged.9 Any substan-
tive implications of the commission's action transferring the lan-
guage from article II to article I are subtle at best. 2
D. Rights of Juvenile Offenders
Since 1950, the Florida Constitution has permitted the legislature
to establish separate proceedings for disciplining juvenile offenders
without regard to the constitutional restrictions applicable to the
prosecution of adult offenders. 3 As a result of the 1968 revision, the
provision concerning juveniles was streamlined and transferred to
article I, section 15(b). It now provides:
90. See Tobin, supra note 57; Note, A Proposal for Revision of the Florida Constitution:
Environmental Rights for Florida Citizens, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 809 (1977); Note, The Florida
Environmental Protection Act of 1971: The Citizen's Role in Environmental Management, 2
FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 736 (1974).
91. The commission rejected Proposal 59, which would have added wildlife to the natural
resources and scenic beauty provision. 17 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 264 (Jan. 10, 1978). Proposal 100,
relating to access to public beaches, was approved by the commission, 19 Fla. C.R.C. Jour.
286 (Jan. 12, 1978), and is discussed in Note, Open Beaches in Florida: Right or Rhetoric?,
infra this issue.
92. Nathaniel Reed characterized the transfer as "simply a house-cleaning move." Tran-
script of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 10 (Jan. 11, 1978). But the following dialogue between
Mathews and Douglass at least suggests the possibility of a more substantial consequence:
"[Douglass:] You have no objection to moving that? [Mathews:] Well, I think it is better
to not be in the Bill of Rights. [Douglass:] Why? [Mathews:] Because the Bill of Rights is
something that you've got to enforce." Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 17 (Jan. 10,
1978).
93. The Legislature shall have power to create and establish Juvenile Courts in
such County or Counties or Districts within the State as it may deem proper, and
to define the jurisdiction and powers of such courts and the officers thereof, and to
vest in such courts exclusive original jurisdiction of all or any criminal cases where
minors under any age specified by the Legislature from time to time are accused,
including the right to define any or all offenses committed by any such persons as
acts of delinquency instead of crimes; to provide for the qualification, election or
selection and appointment of judges, probation officers and such other officers and
employees of such courts as the Legislature may determine, and to fix their com-
pensation and term of office; all in such manner, for such time, and according to
such methods as the Legislature may prescribe and determine, without being lim-
ited therein by the provisions in this Constitution as to trial by jury in Sections 3
and 11 of the Declaration of Rights, as to use of the terms "prosecuting attorney"
and "information" in Section 10 of the Declaration of Rights, as to election or
appointment of officers in Section 27 of Article 3, as to jurisdiction of criminal cases
in Sections 11, 17, 22 and 25 of Article 5, as to original jurisdiction of the interests
of minors in Section 11 of Article 5, and as to style of process and prosecuting in
the name of the State in Section 37 of Article 5, or other existing conflicting provi-
sions of the constitution.
FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. V, § 50 (1950), becoming art. V, § 12 in 1956, when revised art. V
was approved. No substantive changes were made to the provision in the 1956 revision.
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When authorized by law, a child as therein defined may be
charged with a violation of law as an act of delinquency instead of
crime and tried without a jury or other requirements applicable to
criminal cases. Any child so charged shall, upon demand made as
provided by law before a trial in a juvenile proceeding, be tried in
an appropriate court as an adult. A child found delinquent shall
be disciplined as provided by law.
This provision, like its predecessor, merely authorizes but does not
require the legislature to establish a system under which a juvenile
may be "tried without a jury or other requirements applicable to
criminal cases." However, since the legislature has accepted the
constitutional invitation,' a juvenile is left without a state constitu-
tional basis for claiming the right to jury trial, bail, confrontation,
counsel, or the right to be free from double jeopardy and self-
incrimination.
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court observed that "neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."95 With that observation, the Court began the process of con-
forming the generally lax and sometimes arbitrary juvenile proceed-
ings to "the basic requirements of due process and fairness"" man-
dated by the Federal Constitution. In proceedings to determine the
delinquency of a juvenile, due process now requires timely notice of
the charges; the right to be represented by counsel, retained or
appointed; the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; and
protection from self-incrimination. 7 Proof of delinquency must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt,99 and the double jeopardy
clause prevents the state from trying a juvenile as an adult after a
juvenilel court determination that he has violated a statute.9
The Court, however, has rejected the claim that due process re-
quires the right to trial by jury in juvenile proceedings.'"0 Although
admitting its disillusionment with the juvenile court system, the
Court was unwilling in 1971 to impose the jury trial requirement on
the states. Rather, it encouraged the states to experiment and "to
seek in new and different ways the elusive answers to the problems
of the young. . . ."101 Nor did the Court exclude the possibility that
94. See FLA. STAT. § 39.09 (1977), as amended by ch. 78-414, 1978 Fla. Laws -
(CS/CS/SB 119).
95. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
96. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966).
97. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
98. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
99. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
100. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
101. Id. at 547.
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jury trial might be, at least in part, an answer to the complex youth-
ful offender problem. But the Court insisted that choice was to be
made as a matter of state-not federal-policy: "If, in its wisdom,
any State feels the jury trial is desirable in all cases, or in certain
kinds, there appears to be no impediment to its installing a system
embracing that feature. That, however, is the State's privilege and
not its obligation.' '0
Both the idea of prohibiting trial of juvenile offenders without a
jury and the idea of establishing a right to trial by jury in all cases
when a deprivation of personal liberty might result were suggested
to the commission during the first round of public hearings.03 Nei-
ther of these requests received the number of votes necessary under
commission rules to warrant further study, and thus they were not
referred to committee. However, at the first meeting of the Declara-
tion of Rights Committee, the need for section 15(b) was ques-
tioned,0 and a memorandum explaining the provision and identify-
ing the consequences if it should be deleted was requested. 05 The
committee subsequently voted to recommend no change in section
15(b).106 However, D'Alemberte filed a proposal to delete section
15(b), 101 resulting in full debate of the question of extending the
right to jury trial to juvenile court proceedings.
Section 15(b) provides that a juvenile may demand to be tried as
an adult.' 8 In that event, of course, the juvenile is entitled to trial
by jury. However, in order to secure that right, the juvenile must
sacrifice the beneficent aspects of the juvenile proceeding. 9
102. Id.
103. Suggestions, supra note 54, at 5.
104. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights Committee Minutes 5 (Oct 4, 1977) (remarks of
Jon Moyle).
105. Id.; see Memorandum from Patricia Dore, prepared by Judith Bass, to Declaration
of Rights Committee, re: Article I, Section 15(b) (Oct. 10, 1977).
106. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights Committee Minutes 5 (Oct. 13, 1977).
107. Fla. C.R.C., Proposal 178.
108. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(a) (1977), as amended by ch. 78-414, 1978 Fla. Laws -
(CS/CS/SB 119); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.150(a); see State v. Williams, 304 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1974) (holding that transfer upon demand is mandatory). A juvenile 14 years of age
or older may be tried as an adult involuntarily if, after a waiver hearing, the court transfers
the case. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(a) (1977). A juvenile of any age may be tried as an adult if
"charged with a violation of Florida law punishable by death or by life imprisonment" and
if an "indictment on such charge is returned by the grand jury." Id. § 39.02(5)(c); see
Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 573 (Fla.
1975) (both cases sustain the constitutionality of this procedure).
109. The court may place a delinquent child in a community control program, in the
custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, in a licensed childcare
facility, or require the child to participate in a community work project or to render service
in a public service program. FLA. STAT. § 39.11(1)(a)-(c) (1977), as amended by ch. 78-414,
1978 Fla. Laws - (CS/CS/SB 119). Juvenile proceeding records are not open to public
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D'Alemberte intended to eliminate this constitutionally sanctioned
Hobson's choice. In his view, the legislature's flexibility to build and
maintain a separate juvenile justice system should be restricted
only to the extent the state and federal constitutions limited its
discretion in dealing with adults accused of crime."10 He contended
that approval of his proposal would not affect the legislature's au-
thority to protect juveniles from publicity of their alleged criminal
conduct"' or from the ignominy of a permanent criminal record.",
Most of the other commissioners who debated the proposal seemed
unimpressed with D'Alemberte's arguments, in light of the fact that
the accused juvenile did have the right to trial by jury if he exercised
his right to demand trial as an adult."' It was, as D'Alemberte
characterized it, "a fairly easy philosophical question,""' which the
commission rejected by a substantial margin."
Thus, the commission refused to take the position that juvenile
offenders tried in juvenile court are entitled to the same constitu-
tional rights as accused adults. In effect, this was a rejection of an
opportunity to expand the state constitutional rights of juveniles."'
Consequently, any experimentation in this area must await action
by the legislature. When and if that time arrives, at least section
15(b) will not be an impediment.
E. The Metromedia Standard"7
Article I, section 4 contains standards of proof for defamation
actions in addition to free speech and press provisions. The last two
inspection. FLA. STAT. § 39.12 (1977), as amended by ch. 78-414, 1978 Fla. Laws -
(CS/CS/SB 119).
110. [lit is my intention - and I hope it is the intention of the Commission
- to vote favorably on this to allow the legislature to construct whatever system
they want [but] to make sure that at the end of that system there is the right to
trial by jury before anyone, including a juvenile, is retained or institutionalized or
punished.
Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 302-03 (Jan. 12, 1978) (remarks of Sandy D'Alemberte).
111. Id. at 304. But see FLA. STAT. § 39.12(7) (1977), as amended by ch. 78-414, 1978 Fla.
Laws - (CS/CS/SB 119).
112. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 303 (Jan. 12, 1978) (remarks of Sandy
D'Alemberte).
113. Id. at 298-99 (remarks of Ben Overton); id. at 301 (remarks of LeRoy Collins); id. at
303, 305 (remarks of James Kynes). But see id. at 310 (remarks of Jon Moyle).
114. Id. at 311.
115. Proposal 178 failed by a vote of 11-18. 19 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 291 (Jan. 12, 1978).
116. Although debate on Proposal 178 focused almost exclusively on the right to trial by
jury, the deletion of § 15(b) would have had broader implications. See FLA. CONST. art. I, §§
14-15(a).
117. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Portions of this section
appeared in a memorandum prepared by the author for D'Alemberte and the Ethics, Privacy
and Elections Committee.
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sentences of section 4 state: "In all criminal prosecutions and civil
actions for defamation the truth may be given in evidence. If the
matter charged as defamatory is true and was published with good
motives, the party shall be acquitted or exonerated."
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court subjecting state
libel and slander laws to the restraints of the first amendment have
cast considerable doubt on the validity of the truth-and-good-
motives aspect of section 4.11s In 1964, in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, the Court announced a federal constitutional rule prohib-
iting "a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'- that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.""' 9 The New York Times standard was held applicable to crimi-
nal libel actions as well, prohibiting the punishment of truthful
criticism and the punishment of false statements absent proof of
actual malice. 120 Thus, at least with respect to those instances when
the New York Times rule is applicable-when the defamation plain-
tiff is a public official or public figure' 21-the state constitutional
burden of proof has been superseded by the federal constitutional
standard. 122
Several suggestions from the public dealt specifically with revi-
sion of the defamation provision of section 4. The commission was
asked to establish truth alone, without proof of good motive, as a
complete defense, to provide that reports relating to matters of pub-
lic concern are privileged in the absence of actual malice, to remove
the language concerning the standard of proof, and to establish
standards of proof for cases involving public figures. 23 Although the
118. For examples of Florida cases construing this section, see Florida Publishing Co. v.
Lee, 80 So. 245 (Fla. 1918); Drennen v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 328 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1976) (requiring proof of truth and good motives); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Brautigam, 127 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 821 (1962).
Lee and Brautigam predate New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and
Drennen involves purely private defamation. The Court has not extended federal constitu-
tional protection to "purely private libels, totally unrelated to public affairs." Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72 n.8 (1964). In this area the states may determine for themselves
the appropriate standard for recovery. See Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co., 341 A.2d 856 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1975) for a thorough discussion of this point. Also, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF ToRTs § 580B, at 222-31 (1977), for a discussion of the impact of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) on the common law of libel and slander.
119. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
120. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
121. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Kalvan, The Reasonable
Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267.
122. See Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 221 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969),
rev'd, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
123. Suggestions, supra note 54, at 2-3.
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commission apparently was not interested in pursuing the matter
since none of these suggestions received the votes necessary for com-
mittee referral, the question of revising the defamation aspect of
section 4 was considered by the Ethics, Privacy and Elections Com-
mittee' at D'Alemberte's request.15
D'Alemberte appeared before the committee and urged its favora-
ble consideration of a proposal which would at once have conformed
the state constitution to the federally required standard in cases
involving public officials and public figures and provided greater
leeway than the federally required minimum when the defamatory
material concerned a matter of public interest or concern.' These
ends would have been achieved by deleting the last two sentences
of section 4 and inserting: "In all defamation actions, truth shall be
a defense and, in all matters of public or general interest, the publi-
cation shall be privileged in the absence of actual malice."'27 The
committee voted unanimously to accept the concept in principle,
subject to refinement of the language."" The committee thus agreed
to establish as a state constitutional standard the so-called
Metromedia standard, a federal rule from which the United States
Supreme Court has receded.
In 1971, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,' a plurality of the
Supreme Court changed the focus of the New York Times rule from
the identity of the plaintiff-public official/public figure-to the
nature of the material published. The actual malice rule was held
to apply in a libel action brought by a private individual seeking
recovery for the publication of a "defamatory falsehood in a news-
cast relating to his involvement in an event of public or general
concern . ... 1,0 Three years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
the Court rejected the Metromedia plurality's position and held
that "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the
States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood in-
jurious to a private individual."'' The committee accepted the
124. This committee was chaired by Jon C. Moyle and included LeRoy Collins, Dexter
Douglass, Lois Harrison, Jesse McCrary, Ben Overton, Kenneth Plante, and J.B. Spence.
Charlotte Hubbard was included as an alternate.
125. Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 1-2 (Oct. 14, 1977).
D'Alemberte also filed a proposal providing that: "The right to collect, edit and publish
information on government and issues of public or general concern shall not be abridged."
Fla. C.R.C., Proposal 243. Proposal 243 was temporarily passed, see Fla. C.R.C., Calendar 4
(Jan. 27, 1978), but was never considered and died on the Calendar.
126. Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 1 (Oct. 14, 1977).
127. Id. at 2.
128. Id.
129. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
130. Id. at 52.
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Gertz invitation and voted to recommend that as a matter of state
constitutional law, proof of actual malice was necessary before re-
covery could be had for publication of a defamatory falsehood in-
juring a private individual who was involved in a matter of public
concern.132
Proposal 4 was handled by Douglass on the floor. He explained
that federally imposed standards had rendered the current defama-
tion provision obsolete in cases involving public officials and public
figures and that, therefore, the language was in need of revision. The
options available to the commission, in his opinion, were either to
conform the state constitution to the federal requirements in all
respects or to adopt the committee proposal, which would provide
greater state constitutional protection to publishers from damage
awards for defamation arising out of reports on matters about which
there was legitimate public concern. 133
Commissioner Kenneth Plante offered a series of amendments to
Proposal 4 which would have implemented the first option articu-
lated by Douglass. Plante first tried to strike section 4 entirely and
substitute verbatim the language of the first amendment to the
United States Constitution. 3 Plante explained that, if adopted, his
amendment would accomplish two goals. First, it would reduce the
length of the state constitution by combining into one short provi-
sion principles now stated in three somewhat longer sections. Sec-
ond, it would establish a state constitutional standard in the area
of free speech and press that is precisely the same as the federal
standard.' The amendment failed on a voice vote, 36 probably be-
cause, as Douglass suggested in questioning Plante, the amendment
as drafted reached far beyond the narrow area being debated.' 37
Plante accepted Douglass' suggestion and offered a second
amendment to the pending proposal which struck all of section 4
131. 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
132. Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 4 (Oct. 19, 1977). In
light of the Florida Supreme Court's expressed preference for the phrase "matters of public
or general concern" over the phrase "matters of public or general interest," Firestone v. Time,
Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 748 (Fla. 1972), remanded, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the language ultimately
approved by the committee was: "In all defamation actions, truth shall be a defense and, in
all matters of public or general concern, the publication shall be privileged in the absence of
actual malice." Fla. C.R.C., Proposal 4. For a general discussion of this issue, see Note, Media
Liability for Libel of Newsworthy Persons: Before and After Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 5 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 446 (1977).
133. 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 137-49 (Jan. 9, 1978).
134. 16 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 259 (Jan. 9, 1978).
135. 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 150-54 (Jan. 9, 1978).
136. 16 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 258 (Jan. 9, 1978).
137. 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 153 (Jan. 9, 1978).
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and substituted: "The legislature shall make no law abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press."' 3 Plante and Douglass again
were the principal debaters. Plante told the commissioners that if
they approved Proposal 4 in its original form,
[Ylou are granting a greater freedom to the press and speech than
the United States Constitution. You are making it harder for a
private citizen who has had something printed or written or said
about him to get any kind of redress in the courts to try to make
that individual or that association or whatever it is be answerable
when they present an outright lie."'
Douglass countered with this comparison of the choices before the
commission:
[T]he real issue that you get to on this is whether or not in Florida
we are going to stand up for freedom of speech as we perceive it
and grant the right to free comment on issues of public concern
If you want to abdicate to Washington, then adopt Senator
Plante's amendment. If you want Florida to stand on its own two
feet, then adopt one that will work for you.'4 '
Adjournment time arrived before the commission had an opportun-
ity to vote on whether it wished to abdicate to Washington."'
When debate resumed the following day, Plante offered a substi-
tute amendment which struck the last sentence in Proposal 4, the
new language proposed by the committee. 142 The effect of the substi-
tute was to remove all reference to defamation from the state consti-
tution. That drew comment from Commissioner Ben Overton. In his
view, adoption of the substitute amendment would leave the proper
standard of liability in those cases not controlled by the Federal
Constitution completely to the discretion of the Florida Supreme
Court."3 Such a basic policy question, in Overton's opinion, was
more appropriately decided in a political, rather than a judicial,
forum.' Plante seemed to view such an eventuality as inevitable,
regardless of the commission's action, and in any event more desira-
138. 16 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 259 (Jan. 9, 1978).
139. 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 164-65 (Jan. 9, 1978).
140. Id. at 167-68.
141. 16 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 259 (Jan. 9, 1978).
142. 17 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 262 (Jan. 10, 1978).
143. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 69-70 (Jan. 10, 1978). At that time, Commis-
sioner Overton was chief justice of the Florida Supreme Court.
144. Id. at 71.
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ble than approving the standard proposed by the committee.' The
substitute amendment was adopted by an eighteen to thirteen vote.
Proposal 4 as amended then was defeated overwhelmingly by a vote
of eight to twenty-five.11
Since the Supreme Court decisions in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan"17 and Garrison v. Louisiana,"5s the Florida Constitution
has been revised twice. Both times the revisers failed to bring the
language of section 4 into compliance with the federal law.'49 In the
most recent revision, the commission not only left in the state con-
stitution an inaccurate statement of law, offensive to legal purists
and misleading to the people, but it also rejected an effort to estab-
lish a defamation standard more protective of publishers' rights
than the federally required standard. It then rejected as well an
effort to establish the federal standard as state law. The commis-
sion's inability to formulate an acceptable policy in this area means,
as Overton warned, that conflicts between the rights of free speech
and press and the individual's interest in good reputation will be
resolved by the judiciary, unaided by political policymakers-the
commission and the people.150
III. AN ENRICHED DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Despite these failures, the commission's overall response to indi-
vidual rights issues was quite positive. No provision currently secur-
ing rights for the individual or for the people collectively was recom-
mended for deletion from article I. Rather, the commission reaf-
firmed those rights and liberties which past generations had secured
and used them as a foundation upon which to construct "an en-
hanced and enriched Bill of Rights" designed to serve the future
needs of Floridians.
The revisions prohibiting the deprivation of any rights on account
of gender and prohibiting binding interest arbitration in the public
145. Id. at 72-74 (remarks of Kenneth Plante).
146. 17 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 262 (Jan. 10, 1978).
147. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
148. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
149. Florida's action is not without parallel. When Illinois revised its constitution in 1970,
the convention essentially made no change in its libel provision, which reads: "In trials for
libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable
ends, shall be a sufficient defense." ILL. CONST. art I, § 4; see Helman' & Whalen,
Constitutional Commentary, in 1 ILL. STAT. ANN. CONST. 296 (Smith-Hurd 1971).
150. See Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450 (Colo. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc.,
321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. 3d Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Chapadeau v.
Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc,, 341 N.E.2d 569 (N.Y. 1975).
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sector are examined elsewhere in this issue.'5' In addition to those
two revisions and the declaration of state constitutional independ-
ence briefly discussed in the Introduction to this article, the com-
mission adopted five other proposals revising article I. The commis-
sion recommended to the people proposals specifying that testimony
cannot be compelled unless transactional immunity is granted in
exchange for the testimony, reforming the money bail system, re-
forming Florida grand jury proceedings, recognizing a right to be let
alone by government, and requiring all branches and all levels of
government to be open and accessible to the people. This section
recounts the drafting, debating, redrafting, and refining of these five
proposed revisions-each of which offers greater protection for indi-
vidual liberty under the state constitution than is guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution.
Perhaps in recommending these proposals the commission was
subscribing to the following sentiments expressed by Justice Bren-
nan:
State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their
protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which
has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit
the independent protective force of state law-for without it, the
full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.' 2
A. Transactional Immunity
The Florida Constitution now provides that "[n]o person shall
..be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against
himself.' 1 53 This statement essentially tracks the language of the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. 15' The right not
to give evidence against oneself poses obvious law enforcement
problems. Immunity statutes, therefore, have been enacted to en-
able the state to secure information about unlawful activity while
at the same time protecting the person forced to speak from criminal
151. Note, One Small Word: Sexual Equality Through the State Constitution, infra this
issue; Note, Prohibiting Binding Arbitration: The Proposed Change in Article I, Section 6,
infra this issue.
152. Brennan, supra note 12, at 491.
153. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
154. "No person .. .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ...." U.S. CONST. amend. V. It has been suggested that since the Florida constitu-
tional provision refers to any criminal "matter," as compared with any criminal "case" in
the Federal Constitution, the state provision affords broader protection. D'Alemberte,
Commentary, in 25A FLA. STAT. ANN. 111, 112 (West 1970).
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liability for conduct about which he is forced to testify.'"
A person who has been granted immunity must testify or suffer
imprisonment for contempt. Since such a person is therefore com-
pelled to waive his constitutional right against self-incrimination,
should not the immunity be coextensive with the constitutional
protection? In 1892 the United States Supreme Court said that
"absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to
which the question relates" was required by the fifth amendment.'"
In recent years, however, the Court has receded from that position
and now maintains that the fifth amendment is satisfied if a person
is granted use and derivative use immunity in exchange for waiving
his right to be silent. "' 7
Since 1905, Florida has by statute"' granted transactional im-
munity to a person when his testimony is compelled. However, in
recent sessions the legislature has indicated interest in changing the
statutory immunity to use and derivative use.' 9 Furthermore, the
Florida Supreme Court in Tsavaris v. Scruggs, has reserved as an
"open question" the issue of whether the Florida Constitution re-
quires transactional immunity. 0 The commission received conflict-
155. See Note, The Florida Grand Jury: Abolition or Reform?, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 829
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Florida Grand Jury], for a discussion evaluating transactional
and use immunity and recommending constitutional revision in this area. The commission
had the benefit of the note author's analysis and suggestions on this subject, most of which
first appeared in a memorandum distributed to the Declaration of Rights Committee at
D'Alemberte's request. See Memorandum from Patricia Dore, prepared by Robert Q. Wil-
liams, to Steven J. Uhlfelder, re: Article I, Section 16: Use and Transactional Immunity
(Sept. 12, 1977).
156. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892).
157. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n
of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
158. Ch. 5400, § 1, 1905 Fla. Laws 78 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (1977)).
159. Senator Ed Dunn introduced a use and derivative use immunity bill in the senate
during the 1977 session. Fla. SB 19 (1977). A companion bill was introduced in the house of
representatives by Rep. Ralph Haben. Fla. HB 1114 (1977). The house bill passed by a vote
of 115-2. FLA. H.R. Jous. 216 (Reg. Sess. 1977). After amending it, the senate also passed the
house bill, and by a near unanimous vote: 39-1. FLA. S. JouR. 216-18 (Reg. Sess. 1977). The
house refused to concur in the senate amendments, and the bill died on the calendar upon
adjournment sine die. FLA. H.R. Jout. 373 (Reg. Sess. 1977). Senator Dunn again introduced
a use and derivative use immunity bill during the 1978 session. Fla. SB 130 (1978). The bill,
which had no house companion, received three references: Judiciary Criminal, Judiciary
Civil, and Rules. A committee substitute was passed out by the Judiciary Criminal Commit-
tee. Fla. CS/SB 130 (1978). The bill died in the Judiciary Civil Committee.
160. 360 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1977). The court made the following observation in footnote 6:
Immunity statutes are designed to insulate the witness against the incriminating
effect of testimony the State compels him to give. As a federal constitutional mat-
ter, it is only necessary that the witness be given use immunity. Zicarelli v. New
Jersey Com'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972); Kastigar v. United States, 406
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ing suggestions from the public-one to require use immunity and
one to require transactional immunity.'"' Neither was referred to
committee for study even though D'Alemberte had sent a memoran-
dum to all commissioners calling their attention to the issue.'"
Barron, who has been a staunch opponent of legislative attempts
to replace transactional immunity with use and derivative use im-
munity, introduced Proposal 255 to amend section 9 by adding:
Any person having knowledge or possession of facts that tend to
establish the guilt of any other person or corporation under the
laws of the state shall not be excused from giving testimony or
producing evidence, when legally called upon to do so, on the
ground that it may tend to incriminate him under the laws of the
state; but no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any pen-
alty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or
thing concerning which he may so testify.' 3
The commission approved Proposal 255 by a vote of twenty-three
to five without debate.'6 ' The question was debated subsequently,
however, when Commissioner William James offered an amend-
ment to strike the language added by Proposal 255.115 In explaining
the amendment, James raised the specter of organized crime.
"[M]ost of your state attorneys were opposed to this particular
type of immunity in the constitution, and being used because they
thought it would be a detriment against our fight against organized
crime in the State of Florida."161 Other commissioners stressed the
U.S. 441 (1972). Under Section 914.04, Florida Statutes (1975), the prosecutor, by
requiring a subpoenaed witness to testify over objection on self-incrimination
grounds, confers transactional immunity as to the matter about which he inquires
and use immunity as to other offenses. State ex rel. Hough v. Popper, 287 So. 2d
282, reh. den. 287 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1974). Whether, in such circumstances, this
broader grant of immunity is required by Art. I, § 9, Florida Constitution, is an open
question.
Id. at 749.
161. Suggestions, supra note 54, at 5.
162. The memorandum, dated August 23, 1977, said: "There have been some suggestions
that the Fifth Amendment and its Florida counterpart in Article I, Section 9 are outmoded.
I hope you will have time to read the enclosed article from the New Yorker on the origins of
the Fifth Amendment." (The article enclosed was Harris, Annals of Law: Taking the Fifth
(pt. I), NEw YORKER, Apr. 5, 1976, and id. (pt. 2), Apr. 12, 1976.)
163. Fla. C.R.C., Proposal 255.
164. 25 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 358 (Jan. 27, 1978); see Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings
180 (Jan. 27, 1978). The commission subsequently approved the following amendments to the
provision, which were incorporated in Proposal 258 from the Committee on Style and Draft-
ing: insert the word "natural" before "person" to make clear that artificial entities are not
entitled to the protection and delete "or corporation" because the word "person" in that
context includes both natural and artificial persons. 26 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 364 (Mar. 6, 1978).
165. 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 527 (Mar. 7, 1978) (amend. 4).
166. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 83 (Mar. 7, 1978).
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inappropriateness of the subject for constitutional treatment."7 The
proponents countered with the argument that only by guaranteeing
transactional immunity constitutionally could the right against self-
incrimination be secured. In a question to Commissioner John
Moore, Commissioner James Kynes asked:
Would you believe me, sir, if you believe in the Fifth Amend-
ment right, and you think that transactional immunity is the
proper law and should be a law of Florida, and it does run to the
heart of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination;
that we should implant this in the constitution of the State of
Florida?'
It is fair to say that the major policy questions were addressed by
the commission, although the fine points of the arguments on both
sides of the issue were at times confused and even inaccurate.
Throughout the debate, for example, the proponents spoke of a
"fifth amendment right."'69 They were, of course, discussing the
state constitutional right against self-incrimination in section 9.
The phrase "fifth amendment right," though technically inaccur-
ate, apparently was convenient shorthand, understood by lay people
and lawyers alike, for expressing the right of a person not to testify
about matters which might incriminate him. Opponents painted
transactional immunity as a type of shield behind which the devious
could hide while confessing a life of crime to prosecutors impotent
to act. Plante, for example, paraded this horrible:
Let's say that you are pulled in under grand jury investigation
dealing with . . .some type of conspiracy in a fraud case. And
while you are in there, you say, by the way, remember that murder
that happened last spring? I was the one who did it. Is that person
immune then from prosecution under transactional immunity be-
cause he has come forward in a grand jury and said that he mur-
dered those people?'70
It is clear that immunity attaches only to those matters about
which a person is compelled to testify over his objection. The grand
jury witness who confesses guilt in the circumstances described by
Plante's hypothetical would do so at his peril. Even assuming that
immunity had been granted to the witness, it would extend only to
167. Id. at 83, 93, 95 (remarks of William James); id. at 90-91 (remarks of Kenneth
Plante); id. at 88 (remarks of John Moore).
168. Id. at 89. See also id. at 84 (remarks of Dexter Douglass).
169. See generally id. at 83-98.
170. Id. at 90-91. See also id. at 94 (remarks of William James).
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those transactions about which the grand jury or the state attorney
inquired. In any event, since transactional immunity is currently
required by statute in Florida, elevating the doctrine to constitu-
tional status would not change the substantive contours of the im-
munity.
By rejecting the James amendment, 7' the commission recognized
that transactional immunity is the sine qua non of the constitu-
tional right against self-incrimination in Florida. It thus voted to
close the "open question" of Tsavaris.
B. Pretrial Release
The need for revising the state constitutional provision concern-
ing pretrial release and the likely consequences of the commission's
proposal in this area are addressed elsewhere in this issue of the
Review. 7 2 This section of this article traces the evolution of the bail
reform measure with a view toward providing a comprehensive his-
tory of the commission's action and laying a predicate for the bail
article mentioned above.
Amending article I, section 14 to provide for pretrial release on
personal recognizance was recommended to the commission at the
public hearings 73 and was an issue which the commission expressed
interest in pursuing."' The matter was referred to the Declaration
of Rights Committee for study and development.'75 The committee
debated two proposals. One, offered by Collins, was rejected be-
cause it seemed to increase judicial discretion while failing to estab-
lish any presumption in favor of nonmonetary bail.' Recognizing
that the present Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure permit release
on personal recognizance but that with the constitutional language
entitling a person to release "on reasonable bail, with sufficient
171. 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 527 (Mar. 7, 1978). The vote on the amendment was 11-22.
172. Brummer & Rogow, An End to Ransom: The Case for Amending the Bail Provision
of the Florida Constitution [hereinafter cited as An End to Ransom], infra this issue.
173. Suggestions, supra note 54, at 5.
174. List of 232, supra note 55, at 1.
175. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights Committee Minutes 2 (Oct. 4, 1977). Initially, the
committee considered requiring the legislature to provide by law for pretrial release, condi-
tions of such release, and pretrial release on bail or other terms. Id. at 5.
176. Collins proposed that § 14 be amended as follows:
Until adjudged guilty, every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal
or county ordinance shall be entitled to release on assurances ascertained by the
court or reasonable bail, with suffieient-ys-etunless charged with a capital offense
or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and- heo-of-4gilt-is-evkidet-e;
the-peoumption-91m4t giving due weight to the evidence and to the nature and
circumstances of the event.
Fla. C.R.C., Delegation of Rights Committee Minutes 5 (Oct. 13, 1977) (new language under-
lined; deleted language struck through).
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surety" there was no guarantee under the state constitution that
nonmonetary bail always would be available, Douglass moved the
deletion of "with sufficient surety" and the insertion after the word
"bail" of the phrase "which includes personal recognizance." This
motion was approved unanimously. "
Before Proposal 24 was debated on the floor, D'Alemberte ex-
pressed to Douglass concern about its inadequacy and sought his
support for the following language: "Until adjudged guilty, every
person charged with a crime or violation of municipal or county
ordinance shall be released upon conditions guaranteed to secure his
appearance at future court proceedings. Monetary bail shall be re-
quired only if no other method will secure this appearance."'7 " Doug-
lass, joined by D'Alemberte, Spence, McCrary, and Don Reed, of-
fered this language on the floor as an amendment to Proposal 24.11,
The purpose of the amendment, as explained by Douglass, was to
create a presumption in favor of release on nonmonetary bail and
to impose on the state the burden of demonstrating the insufficiency
of nonmonetary release.'"I The debate disclosed no significant oppo-
sition to those consequences.' However, several commissioners
were uncomfortable because the amendment did not discriminate,
as did the existing language and the committee proposal, between
(1) capital offenses and offenses for which a life sentence was possi-
ble, and (2) all other crimes.' An amendment was offered by Com-
missioner Robert Shevin, joined by Douglass, and approved by the
commission which restored the exception for capital offenses and
177. Id. As recommended by the committee, Proposal 24 provided:
Until adjudged guilty, every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal
or county ordinance shall be entitled to release on reasonable bail which includes
personal recognizance with * ,eibt ety unless charged with a capital offense
or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or
the presumption is great.
178. Letter to Dexter Douglass from Talbot D'Alemberte (Nov. 7, 1977) (on file with the
State Archives). The language was suggested in a telephone conversation by Professor Bruce
Rogow to the author, who in turn suggested it to D'Alemberte. D'Alemberte also received the
following suggestion from Bennett Brummer, Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit:
"Until adjudged guilty, every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal or county
ordinance shall be entitled to release on reasonable bail and to have release conditioned upon
the least restrictive alternative likely to assure his presence before the court." Letter to Steven
Uhlfelder, executive director of the Constitution Revision Commission, from Bennett H.
Brummer (undated) (on file with the State Archives).
179. 12 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 213 (Dec. 6, 1977).
180. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 217 (Dec. 6, 1977) (remarks of Dexter Doug-
lass).
181. But see id. at 221-27 (remarks of John Moore); id. at 232-34 (remarks of Robert
Shevin).
182. Id. at 218 (remarks of Robert Shevin); id. at 220-21 (remarks of LeRoy Collins).
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offenses punishable by life imprisonment.' 3 Commissioner William
Birchfield then offered an amendment, which was adopted without
debate, striking the word "guaranteed" and inserting "reasonable
under the circumstances.' ' s4 Birchfield was concerned that without
his amendment it would be incumbent on the judiciary to guarantee
the appearance of released persons.' 5
Only Shevin opposed the Douglass amendment. He preferred the
approach of the original proposal, arguing that, as amended, Pro-
posal 24 in effect would establish as the state constitutional stan-
dard the holding of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pugh v.
Rainwater's-a standard which the state was contesting at the
time.' 7 As proponents of the amendment, McCrary and Douglass
both argued that monetary bail discriminated against poor peo-
ple.'88 Reminding the commissioners that the historical purpose of
bail was only to ensure an accused's presence in court, McCrary
argued that reliance on money to secure appearance was inherently
discriminatory and unfair:
[I]t does discriminate against the poor, the depressed. And I'm
not talking about races. It's discriminating against poor whites,
poor Cubans, poor Puerto Ricans, poor anybody that doesn't wear
a tie and drive a Thunderbird. It discriminates against the migrant
and against any one of you for any particular night if you don't
have your billfold saying that you're a lawyer or a banker or Indian
chief.' 9
The Douglass amendment was approved on a voice vote. Proposal
24 as thus amended was adopted by a vote of thirty-three to one. 9
183. 12 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 213 (Dec. 6, 1977).
184. Id.
185. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 230-31 (Dec. 6, 1977) (remarks of William
Birchfield).
186. 557 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1977), modified, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
187. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 232-34 (Dec. 6, 1977) (remarks of Robert
Shevin); see An End to Ransom, supra note 172.
188. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 235-38 (Dec. 6, 1977) (remarks of Jesse
McCrary); id. at 239-44 (remarks of Dexter Douglass).
189. Id. at 236-37.
190. 12 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 213 (Dec. 6, 1977). The lone negative vote was cast by Jan Platt.
As adopted December 6, 1977, Proposal 24 read:
Until adjudged guilty, every person charged with a crime or violation of munici-
pal or county ordinance shall be released upon conditions reasonable under the
circumstances to secure his appearance at future court proceedings, unless charged
with a capital crime or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof
of guilt is evident or the presumption is great. Monetary bail shall be required only
if no other method will secure this appearance.
The Style and Drafting Committee recommended several changes to the provision, based on
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After the second round of public hearings and in response to the
criticism of its proposed revision of section 14,111 the commission
revisited the bail issue. Plante offered the following amendment,
which differed substantially from the commission's prior action:
Every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal or
county ordinances, except as otherwise provided herein, shall be
released upon conditions reasonable under the circumstances to
secure his appearance at future court proceedings including mone-
tary bail when no other method is adequate. No person charged
with a capital offense or an offense punishable with life imprison-
ment shall be released prior to trial unless it is determined that
release or bail with adequate surety will adequately insure his
appearance in court.'
Debate on the Plante amendment centered around two issues: the
effect of the language in the first sentence on the presumption of
nonmonetary release and the effect of the deletion in the second
sentence of the "proof is evident or the presumption is great"
standard.
With respect to the first sentence, Plante explained that his
amendment would remove from the state the burden of proving that
money bail was necessary to ensure a person's presence at future
court proceedings.' 93 McCrary offered an amendment striking
"including monetary bail when no other method is adequate" from
comments submitted by Professor Rogow. See letter to Talbot D'Alemberte from Bruce
Rogow (Dec. 21, 1977) (on file with State Archives); Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings
13 (Mar. 6, 1977). The commission, however, amended the provision substantively before it
approved the report of the Style and Drafting Committee.
191. The Center for Governmental Responsibility, University of Florida, Public Testi-
mony Before the Florida Constitution Revision Commission, Summaries of Points Raised at
Hearings Feb. 21, 22, and 23, 1978, at 6 (Mar. 2, 1978).
192. 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 526 (Mar. 7, 1978) (amend. 13).
193. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 46 (Mar. 7,1978) (remarks of Kenneth Plante).
The following dialogue between John Moore and Plante was especially revealing:
[John Moore:] [Ihf I interpret what we have already passed in this Proposal 258,
if my interpretation is correct, it would require the state to prove that a money bail
is the only method by which appearance at trial can be assured, and only in that
case would they require money bail. Do you feel that this amendment that you are
proposing here changes that burden on the state?
[Plante:] I think so .... [lit is my personal feeling that I think it will give
the judge that flexibility. He will not have to prove that the person could not be
released on [his] own recognizance. It is just that he feels the bail ought to be
posted.
I think what we have adopted puts the burden on the state to prove that a person
should not be released on [his] own recognizance ....
I think this would relieve it to a degree - not all the way, but to a degree.
Id. at 50-51. See also id. at 80-82 (remarks of Kenneth Plante); id. at 75-76 (remarks of James
Kynes).
OF RIGHTS LOST AND GAINED
the first sentence of Plante's amendment." 4 McCrary sought to
leave to judicial discretion the decision of whether money bail was
necessary."' The McCrary amendment, which was adopted by
unanimous voice vote, was later withdrawn by the sponsor after the
commission approved a motion by Kynes to reconsider the vote by
which it had passed."' Neither McCrary nor Kynes offered any
meaningful explanation for this turnaround." 7 The commission did,
however, adopt a noncontroversial amendment inserting "until ad-
judged guilty" at the beginning of the first sentence."' There were
no other amendments to the first sentence and, except for comments
by Plante and Kynes stressing that the language guaranteed maxi-
mum flexibility to the courts, 19 there was no further debate on that
aspect of Plante's amendment.
Debate on the second sentence of the Plante amendment, which
concerned release of persons charged with capital offenses or crimes
punishable by a life prison term, involved two issues: whether any-
one so charged should be eligible for release on personal recogniz-
ance and whether the "proof is evident or the presumption is great"
language should be deleted. Under the Plante amendment, a person
so charged was not entitled to release "unless it is determined that
release or bail with adequate surety will adequately insure his ap-
pearance in court." Commissioner John Ware offered an amend-
ment striking "or" and substituting "on." 0' 1 Explaining his amend-
ment, Ware stated that "there ought to be a requirement that when
[persons are] charged with a capital offense or an offense punisha-
ble by life imprisonment, that they not be released unless they post
bail to insure that they will appear. ' ' 2 2 Plante accepted the Ware
amendment, stating that "or" was a typographical error. The com-
mission adopted the Ware amendment by a vote of twenty-eight to
four.203
The potential federal constitutional problems created by the
194. 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 526 (Mar. 7, 1978) (amend. 13A).
195. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 53 (Mar. 7, 1978).
196. 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 526 (Mar. 7, 1978).
197. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 61-62 (Mar. 7, 1978). McCrary's only explana-
tion was "that after some consultation with Commissioner Plante and Commissioner Doug-
lass, I would like to withdraw my amendment." Id. at 62.
198. 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 526 (Mar. 7, 1978) (amend. 13B).
199. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 75-76 (Mar. 7, 1978) (remarks of James
Kynes); id. at 80-82 (remarks of Kenneth Plante).
200. 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 526 (Mar. 7, 1978) (amend. 13) (emphasis added); see text
accompanying note 192 supra.
201. 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 526 (Mar. 7, 1978) (amend. 13C).
202. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 70 (Mar. 7, 1978) (remarks of John Ware).
203. 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 526 (Mar. 7, 1978).
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Ware amendment2°4 were avoided when the commission adopted an
amendment by Shevin, Douglass, and Collins striking the second
sentence of the Plante amendment and substituting the following
language: "No person charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by life imprisonment shall be released prior to trial when
the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great." 2 The
proponents argued that, as a matter of policy, a person charged with
committing a capital offense or an offense for which a life term was
possible and against whom there was substantial evidence should
not be entitled to release pending trial-regardless of the likelihood
that he would appear for trial. 20 1 There also was an indication that
some commissioners had an eye on the upcoming constitutional
referendum and were willing to compromise on this aspect of the
proposal so as not to endanger all reform of the bail system. For
instance, Kynes urged adoption of the amendment because:
[Als a practical matter, the opponents of bail bond reform will
use the language [of the Plante amendment] to go over the State
and say this is nothing more than a vehicle to let killers out on the
street. . . . I believe that as a practical matter those of you who
voted for bail bond reform should accept this amendment, so as
to not give the opponents, the bail bondsmen around the State, the
opportunity to use that as a battle cry.217
Only John Moore spoke against the amendment. He argued that a
person was entitled to the presumption of innocence, regardless of
the crime. "If a person is presumed innocent for burglary, he is
presumed innocent from murder. If you want to change that pre-
sumption of innocence, vote for this proposal. If you feel that every-
one is presumed innocent until proven guilty, vote against this
proposal. ' ' 20 The amendment was adopted by a vote of twenty-nine
to three.209
204. To the extent that pretrial release conditioned exclusively on payment of money bail
invidiously discriminates against the poor, the Ware amendment raised substantial four-
teenth amendment problems. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1977), modified,
572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); An End to Ransom, supra note 172.
205. 29 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 544 (Mar. 9, 1978) (amend. 19). Collins had offered-but with-
drawn-a similarly worded amendment earlier. See Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 58,
60 (Mar. 7, 1978).
206. 1 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 26-27 (Mar. 9, 1978) (remarks of Robert
Shevin); id. at 28-30 (remarks of Dexter Douglass); id. at 33-34 (remarks of LeRoy Collins).
See also Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 64-67 (Mar. 7, 1978) (remarks of Yvonne
Burkholz); id. at 77-79 (remarks of LeRoy Collins).
207. 1 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 33 (Mar. 9,1978) (remarks of James Kynes).
See also id. at 33-34 (remarks of LeRoy Collins).
208. Id. at 27.
209. 29 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 544 (Mar. 9, 1978). Negative votes were cast by Brantley,
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The language finally approved by the commission 10 certainly sup-
ports the construction that monetary bail may not be required as a
condition of pretrial release unless other conditions are inadequate
to assure future appearances."' However, as the debate on the
Plante amendment indicates, the commission's intent was to leave
the question of appropriate conditions of release entirely to judicial
discretion, with no particular presumption favoring nonmonetary
criteria limiting that discretion. Whether the proposed revision is
construed to mandate a presumption in favor of nonmonetary condi-
tions or release may depend ultimately on how the provision is
presented to the electorate212 and on constitutional litigation in the
federal courts. Since the commission declined to recommend any
change regarding pretrial release of persons charged with a capital
offense or an offense punishable by a life term, reconciliation of that
provision with the presumption of innocence and the principles of
due process and equal protection likely will rest with the federal
courts.
2 1 1
D'Alemberte, and John Moore.
210. The proposed revision to § 14 provides:
Until adjudged guilty, every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal
or county ordinance shall be released upon conditions reasonable under the circum-
stances to secure his appearance at future court proceedings including monetary
bail when no other method is adequate. . . .No person charged with a capital
offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment shall be released prior to trial
when . . . the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great.
Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. I, § 14 (May 11, 1978) (new language underlined; deletions
omitted).
211. See An End to Ransom, supra note 172.
212. Since it is the intent of the voters to which the court will turn in construing ambigu-
ous language, much will depend on how the newspapers explain the effects of the bail revision.
See Levinson, Interpreting State Constitutions by Resort to the Record, supra this issue. A
summary prepared by the revision commission staff explains the proposed revision of § 14 in
these terms:
This provision requires that one accused of a noncapital offense or of an offense
not punishable by life imprisonment be released upon such conditions as the judge
determines will secure the accused's presence at trial. Currently, persons arrested
for a crime may be released under conditions other than posting monetary bail;
however, monetary bail is still the method most commonly used to secure a person's
appearance at future court proceedings. The proposed change requires the judge,
prior to imposing monetary bail, to determine that conditions such as release to
another person or release on one's own recognizance are not adequate to secure the
person's appearance in court.
Fla. C.R.C., Proposed Revision of the Florida Constitution 1 (1978) (staff summaries of
proposed changes).
213. See Escandar v. Ferguson, 441 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1977), holding that rule
3.130(a), (h)(4), FtA. R. CraM. P., and FiA. CONST. art. I, § 14, violate both the equal protec-
tion and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The author suggested the follow-
ing change in the last sentence of § 14 to meet the federal constitutional infirmities identified
in Escandar: "No person charged with a capital offense or with an offense punishable by life
imprisonment shall be released prior to trial when the proof of guilt is evident or the presump-
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C. Right to Counsel in the Grand Jury Room
The commission considered two proposals relating to the opera-
tion of state grand juries. The first, Proposal 77, would have
amended section 15(a) by requiring a two-thirds vote of the mem-
bers of a grand jury to return an indictment charging a capital crime
or other felony. A similar provision had been recommended by the
1965 Constitution Revision Commission, but it was deleted by the
legislature. 214
By statute, most state grand juries are composed of between fif-
teen and eighteen persons. The concurrence of twelve members is
necessary to return an indictment."' However, by special law, some
populous counties have grand juries composed of twenty-three per-
sons. Fifteen members constitute a quorum, and the concurrence of
twelve members is required to return an indictment.2 16 Commis-
sioner Thomas Barkdull, the sponsor of Proposal 77, viewed the
proposal as a way of guaranteeing equal treatment: regardless of the
population of the county, no person should be indicted on less than
a two-thirds vote of the members of the grand jury.2t ' The proposal
was approved unanimously by the commission. 28
The second proposal concerning grand juries was reported out of
the Declaration of Rights Committee. That committee was asked to
study several suggestions originating from the public testimony, 29
ranging from abolition of the grand jury to providing certain proce-
dural rights for witnesses appearing before the grand jury.220 The
committee approved Proposal 32 to amend section 15(a) by adding
new language dealing with the rights of witnesses called to testify
before a grand jury. Under the provision initially approved by the
committee, a grand jury witness would have the right to be advised
of the right to counsel, the right to have counsel present at all times,
tion is great, unless the court determines that release on bail will secure his appearance at
future court proceedings." Letter from Patricia Dore to Sandy D'Alemberte (Mar. 20, 1978)
(on file with State Archives).
214. See D'Alemberte, Commentary, in 25A FLA. STAT. ANN. 336 (West 1970).
215. FLA. STAT. §§ 905.01, .23 (1977).
216. Ch. 63-753, § 1, 1963 Fla. Laws (Special Acts) 299; ch. 63-824, § 1, 1963 Fla. Laws
(Special Acts) 382.
217. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 197-98 (Dec. 8, 1977).
218. 14 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 231 (Dec. 8, 1977). John Moore and Jan Platt later offered an
amendment to delete the two-thirds vote requirement and other provisions approved by the
commission relating to the grand jury. 27 Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 527 (Mar. 7, 1978) (amend.
12); Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 120 (Mar. 7, 1978). After the question was divided,
i.e., separated as to the individual revisions being addressed by amendment 12, the sponsors
withdrew that portion concerning the two-thirds vote. Id. at 125.
219. Suggestions, supra note 54, at 5-6.
220. Id. See also List of 232, supra note 55, at 2.
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and, if the witness were a target of the investigation, the right to be
advised of that fact before testifying.2 ' However, at a subsequent
meeting, Barron, the prime sponsor of the proposal, suggested that
the second sentence of his proposal-"Such a witness shall have a
right to have counsel present at all times"-was ambiguous and in
need of clarification. It could be read, he said, as authorizing coun-
sel's presence even when the client was not testifying. In any event,
Barron noted, the language did not address the scope of counsel's
role during the proceedings.22 Barron requested and secured com-
mittee approval of an amendment striking the second sentence and
inserting in its stead: "A witness shall have the right to be accompa-
nied by and to receive the advice of counsel during his testimony."zr
Proposal 32 was thoroughly considered by the commission. The
floor debate centered mainly on the policy question of permitting
counsel to accompany a witness into the grand jury room as opposed
to the present practice of allowing the witness to leave the room to
confer with counsel. Supporters of the measure argued that it would
introduce a necessary and long-overdue measure of fairness into
grand jury proceedings: "[W]hat this does is present fairness to
some extent in the grand jury system by allowing a witness, if he
chooses to take a lawyer in the room with him, to keep him from
being intimidated by five prosecutors questioning, to make sure that
that witness' rights are protected . "... ,224 Opponents argued that
the proposal would destroy the secrecy and the investigatory func-
tion of the grand jury:
It's not uncommon for organized crime to provide Counsel for the
witnesses who are subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury. That
Counsel then becomes a conduit back to all other persons who
might be called before that grand jury to testify.
By doing that, you are totally destroying the investigation of the
grand jury. 25
221. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights Committee Minutes 8 (Oct. 20, 1977). The lan-
guage approved was:
Any person called to testify before a grand jury must be advised of his right of
counsel and shall not be compelled to testify against himself unless granted immun-
ity. Such a witness shall have a right to have counsel present at all times. A person
under investigation by a grand jury shall be advised, prior to giving testimony, that
he is under investigation.
Id.
222. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights Committee Minutes 2 (Dec. 7, 1977).
223. Id. at 1-2.
224. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 250 (Dec. 8, 1977) (remarks of Dexter Doug-
lass). See also id. at 254 (remarks of Robert Shevin); id. at 262-63 (remarks of Jesse McCrary);
id. at 264 (remarks of Dempsey Barron); Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 129 (Mar. 7,
1978) (remarks of Dexter Douglass); id. at 132-34 (remarks of Dempsey Barron).
225. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 248 (Dec. 8, 1977) (remarks of John Moore).
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The current practice, which, as noted above, permits the witness to
leave the grand jury room to confer with counsel after each question
if he wishes, was used in debate to illustrate that the proposed
change was not drastic or radical. It also was used to rebut the
argument that the secrecy of the proceedings would be destroyed.",
That aspect of the proposal requiring that a target of an investiga-
tion be notified that he is under investigation before he testifies was
not debated at all. However, the role of a witness' counsel and the
right of an indigent witness to appointed counsel were addressed.
State attorneys who testified before the committee"7 and individ-
ual commissioners25 expressed concern that introduction of a wit-
ness' counsel into the grand jury room would convert the investiga-
tory inquiry of the grand jury into an adversary proceeding. How-
ever, commission approval of the committee amendment specifying
that the witness had a "right to be accompanied by and to receive
the advice of counsel during his testimony '229 foreclosed this possi-
bility. The amendment ensured that counsel would not be allowed
to cross-examine other witnesses, directly examine the client-
witness, interject objections to questions asked by the prosecutor or
a grand juror, or question or address the grand jurors. Counsel's role
226. Id. at 246 (remarks of Dempsey Barron); id. at 250 (remarks of Dexter Douglass);
id. at 257-58 (remarks of LeRoy Collins); id. at 263 (remarks of Jesse McCrary).
227. The committee heard testimony from several state attorneys, including Richard
Gerstein (Eleventh Judicial Circuit), Robert Egan (Ninth Judicial Circuit), and Ed Austin
(Fourth Judicial Circuit). Robert Stone (Nineteenth Judicial Circuit) and Harry Morrison
(Second Judicial Circuit) also were in attendance. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights Com-
mittee Minutes 2-5 (Dec. 7, 1977).
In his testimony, Richard Gerstein stressed the importance of clearly limiting the role of
the witness' counsel. He urged consideration of language similar to that contained in Recom-
mendation 1, ABA Report to the House of Delegates, Section of Criminal Justice, approved
August 9, 1977:
"Such counsel shall be allowed to be present in the grand jury room only during
the questioning of the witness and shall be allowed to advise the witness. Such
counsel shall not be permitted to address the grand jurors or otherwise take part in
the proceedings before the grand jury. The court shall have the power to remove
such counsel from the grand jury room for conduct inconsistent with this principle."
Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights Committee Minutes 5 (Dec. 7, 1977). In response to Ger-
stein, Collins stated that the committee amendment, see text accompanying note 223 supra,
was exclusive and would not authorize counsel to engage in other activity. Fla. C.R.C.,
Declaration of Rights Committee Minutes 5 (Dec. 7, 1977). See also Transcript of Fla. C.R.C.
proceedings 247 (Dec. 8, 1977) (remarks of Dempsey Barron).
228. See Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 254 (Dec. 8, 1977) (remarks of Robert
Shevin).
229. 14 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 232 (Dec. 8, 1977). Barron was prepared to offer an amendment
to the committee amendment inserting "subject to reasonable rules governing appropriate
participation by counsel" after the word "testimony." Copy on file with State Archives. The
amendment was not offered because the commission accepted the view that the committee
amendment adequately clarified counsel's role. See note 230 infra and accompanying text.
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would be passive and limited to advising the client-witness. 211
Commission intent on an indigent witness' right to counsel at
state expense was not as clear as its intent on the role of counsel.
Plante raised the issue by asking Collins, "[B]y putting this in the
constitution as a right to have an attorney, what about in case[s]
of [indigents] called before a grand jury? Would the public de-
fender have to represent [them] if they asked for counsel? '2 3' Col-
lins responded: "Yes, I would think so. He would have that same
right. He would have that same right to have him in there as well
as any other client. ' '232 Collins later corrected that statement, say-
ing, "[Y]ou can't get public defenders until you are charged with
a crime. And a witness before a grand jury may not be charged with
a crime; he probably wouldn't be. 21 33
By statute, the public defender must represent an indigent person
arrested for or charged with a felony, and he may represent a person
under arrest for or charged with a misdemeanor or violation of a
municipal or county ordinance. 234 Of course, if the constitutional
provision confers a right to counsel for all witnesses called before a
grand jury, persons who cannot afford to retain counsel and who
request the assistance of counsel will be entitled to appointed coun-
sel. Whether this appointed counsel would be the public defender,
however, is open to question. The legislature could authorize the
public defender to represent indigent witnesses before the grand
jury. Or, the courts could appoint private counsel. However, the fact
that public defenders presently are not authorized to represent indi-
gent persons not charged with crimes should not detract from Col-
lins' statement that an indigent witness would have the same right
to have counsel in the grand jury room as would any other person.
The issue was raised again, and blurred to some extent, by Doug-
lass' responses to a series of questions from Commissioners Mark
230. Statements by several commissioners made these points quite unequivocally:
"[Tihe attorney could only counsel and advise with the person in the grand jury room."
Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 247 (Dec. 8, 1977) (remarks of Dempsey Barron).
"[Tihe committee wound up by taking the position that we would make it very clear that
the only thing he could do in that room or that he was authorized to do in the room would be
to sit by his client and advise his client when he was called upon for advice." Id. at 257
(remarks of LeRoy Collins). "He's not an adversary there. He's not going to be questioning
the members of the grand jury." Id. at 263 (remarks of Jesse McCrary). "IT]his amendment
• . .says the witness shall have the right to be accompanied and to receive the advice of
Counsel in his testimony . . . . I think that precludes . ..any great abuse occurring be-
cause it places in it the proceeding is limited to being with a witness and advising the
witness." Id. at 255 (remarks of Dexter Douglass).
231. Id. at 261.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 262.
234. FLA. STAT. § 27.51 (1977).
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Hollis2 13 and John Moore.2 3 The language of the proposal does not
support Douglass' construction limiting the right to counsel to per-
sons under investigation. The first sentence provides that "[a]ny
person called to testify before a grand jury shall be advised of his
right to counsel . . . ." The second sentence provides "[a] witness
shall have the right to be accompanied by and to receive the advice
of counsel . . . ." From the context, it seems apparent that both
sentences address the same category of persons. A "person called to
testify before a grand jury" is "a witness." In contrast, the third
sentence concerns a different category of persons-those under in-
vestigation by the grand jury. Thus, a witness before a grand jury
would be entitled to be advised of his right to counsel, to be free
from compelled testimony unless granted immunity, and to be ac-
companied and advised by counsel during his testimony. A person
under investigation by the grand jury who is called as a witness
would be entitled to all those rights plus the right to be notified,
before he testifies, that he is a target of the investigation.237
Nor do Barron's remarks support the Douglass construction. Bar-
ron spoke of "a man named Gideon," jailed in Panama City, who
convinced the United States Supreme Court that his sixth amend-
ment right to counsel had been violated because the state had not
provided counsel for his defense. 238 Stating that Gideon v.
235. [Hollis:] Commissioner, does this mean that every witness before the
grand jury has the right to an attorney?
[Douglass:] If he is under investigation, he does. Or he would have.
[Hollis:] What about indigents, will they be provided with attorneys?
[Douglass:] If they are under investigation and they cannot afford to hire an
attorney, they will be given the same thing they are given now in every other
proceeding, which is a public defender.
Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 130 (Mar. 7, 1978).
236. [J. Moore:] The proposal . . . says: "The witness shall have the right
to be accompanied by and receive the advice of counsel during his testimony."
Now, how do you interpret that to restrict it only to those persons under
investigation?
[Douglass:] I think that is what was proposed intentionally in the committee.
I think Senator Barron, who introduced this, felt that way. That is the way I think
it would be interpreted by reading this.
[J. Moore:] . . . I don't agree with you.
Id. at 131-32. The committee minutes do not indicate that the committee intended to limit
the right to persons under investigation. See generally Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights
Committee Minutes 7-8 (Oct. 20, 1977); id. at 1-5 (Dec. 7, 1977).
237. The language originally proposed by Barron followed the same structure. The first
two sentences spoke respectively of "[any person" and "[s]uch a witness" while the third
sentence spoke of "a person under investigation." See note 221 supra. Although the commit-
tee amendment changed the second sentence substantively, it did not change the class of
persons entitled to the right.
238. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 132-33 (Mar. 7, 1978).
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Wainwright"'5 "is a basis for which now people are entitled to coun-
sel," 0 Barron continued:
It is fundamental that [the grand jury room] is where you need
a lawyer the most. And I think that if we do nothing else, we should
write this provision in the constitution to guarantee to every person
that he not only is entitled to a lawyer, but he is entitled to have
the lawyer with him when he needs him the most."'
The commission approved Proposal 32 by a vote of twenty-five to
five,242 thereby recommending state constitutional rights for grand
jury witnesses which exceed the federal constitutional requirements
in all respects. 2 3 The sixth amendment right to counsel accrues only
"at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been
initiated. '2 Speaking directly to the question of counsel's presence
in the grand jury room, the United States Supreme Court has ob-
served that "[u]nder settled principles the witness may not insist
upon the presence of his attorney in the grand jury room. ' 245 But
even though the right to have counsel present with a witness during
grand jury testimony is not required by the sixth amendment, the
American Bar Association, through its Criminal Justice Section,
recently recommended that counsel be permitted in federal grand
jury rooms.2"
239. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
240. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 133 (Mar. 7, 1978).
241. Id. (emphasis added).
242. 14 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 232 (Dec. 8, 1977). Subsequently the commission defeated by a
vote of 5-28 amendment 12 to Proposal 258, which would have deleted the language inserted
by Proposal 32. 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 527 (Mar. 7, 1978). The Style and Drafting Committee
recommended: that the substance of Proposal 32 be placed in subsection (b) of § 15; that
the current subsection (b) be relettered subsection (c); that "shall" be substituted for "must"
before "be advised"; that "to" be substituted for "of" before "counsel" in the first sentence;
and that the last sentence be reworded to read "Prior to giving testimony, a person under
investigation by a grand jury shall be advised that he is under investigation." Fla. C.R.C.,
Comm. on Style and Drafting, Report to the Florida Constitution Revision Commission 6
(Mar. 6, 1978). The commission adopted these recommendations. 30 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 570
(Apr. 14,1978).
243. See Florida Grand Jury, supra note 155. The committee had the benefit of the note
author's analysis and recommendations, most of which first appeared in a series of memo-
randa prepared at D'Alemberte's request. See Memorandum from Patricia Dore, prepared
by Robert Q. Williams, to Declaration of Rights Committee, re: Article I, Section 15 (Oct.
10, 1977); Memorandum from Patricia Dore, prepared by Robert Q. Williams, to Steven J.
Uhlfelder, re: Article I, Section 15(a) - Abolition of Grand Jury (Sept. 26, 1977). The note
author also testified before the committee concerning grand jury reform. Fla. C.R.C., Declara-
tion of Rights Committee Minutes 7 (Oct. 20, 1977).
244. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972).
245. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976).
246. See ABA Annual Meeting, 46 U.S.L.W. 2089 (Aug. 23, 1977).
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D. The Right to Be Let Alone
The need for a state constitutional provision protecting privacy
has been treated comprehensively elsewhere. 47 This article will ex-
amine the commission's privacy proposal 4' with the objective of
exploring intent on three of its aspects: the limitation to intrusion
by government; the stating of the right in absolute terms; and the
interaction with and relationship to other constitutional provisions
with which it may conflict.
The appropriateness and the necessity of recognizing a state con-
stitutional right of privacy were raised before the commission during
its opening proceedings. 20 The issue also arose at the public hear-
ings.2 ,50 The matter was referred to the Ethics, Privacy and Elections
Committee for study and development. 251 At its second meeting,
that committee unanimously approved in principle the inclusion in
the state constitution of a provision protecting privacy. 2
Agreement on the appropriate language, however, was not as eas-
ily achieved. The committee was divided over two major policy
questions: (1) whether the right ought to protect individuals against
governmental and private intrusion, and (2) whether the right ought
to be stated in absolute or qualified terms. On the other hand, there
was agreement that it would be appropriate and necessary, if a
privacy proposal were adopted, to consider elevating to constitu-
tional status the public records and open meetings laws as well as
to address the obvious conflict with the financial disclosure require-
ments of the Sunshine Amendment.
Douglass and Overton were the strongest supporters of a provision
reaching private as well as governmental intrusion. The committee
initially assented to approving in principle the establishment of a
right of privacy against both private and governmental intrusion.21
247. Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, infra this issue
[hereinafter cited as To Be Let Alone]; Note, Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of State
Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 630 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Toward a Right of
Privacy].
248. As finally approved by the commission, the language reads: "Every natural person
has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except
as otherwise provided herein." Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. I, § 23 (May 11, 1978).
249. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 20-21 (July 6, 1977) (remarks of Ben Overton).
250. Suggestions, supra note 54, at 7. Gerald B. Cope, Jr., the author of Toward a Right
of Privacy, supra note 247, and To Be Let Alone, supra note 247, made a presentation to the
commission at the public hearing held in Gainesville, Fla. See The Center for Governmental
Responsibility, Public Testimony Before the Florida Constitution Revision Commission,
Summaries of Hearings August 18, 1977 - September 26, 1977, at 76-79 (Oct. 6, 1977).
251. Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 2 (Oct. 5, 1977).
252. Id. at 4-5 (Oct. 14, 1977).
253. Id. at 5.
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At the next committee meeting, however, there was a lengthy dis-
cussion concerning the potential impact of a private intrusion provi-
sion on the newsgathering activities of the print and electronic
media. 254 Nevertheless, a motion was made to adopt the following
language: "The right of the individual to be left alone and to be free
from governmental or private intrusion is essential to the well-being
of a free society and shall not be infringed. ' 25 The motion was
withdrawn at Moyle's request in order to permit further reflection
on the impact of the proposed ban on private intrusion.25 No vote
was taken on the language until the last meeting of the committee.
At that time, the committee approved language which created a
self-executing right against governmental intrusion and established
a policy against private intrusion to be implemented by the legisla-
ture.27
Had the committee's position prevailed with the full commission,
protection of privacy in Florida would have encompassed private
activity, an area completely untouched by the federal constitutional
protection. 8 While genuine concern was expressed about invasions
of personal privacy by private individuals and organizations, the
commission seemed to feel that the legislature would address those
problems without a constitutional directive.2 59 The vagueness of the
language, 26 the worry about increasing governmental regulation of
private enterprise, 26' and the possibility of judicial constructions
resulting in unforeseen consequences2 2 resulted in the commission's
refusal to go along with the committee proposal as it related to the
private sector.23
254. The committee heard testimony from James Spaniolo, representing The Miami
Herald, and Sharyn Smith, assistant attorney general, both of whom expressed concern that
newsgathering activities would be adversely affected if the provision guaranteed a right
against private intrusion. Id. at 6-8 (Oct. 19, 1977).
255. Id. at 8.
256. Id. at 8-9.
257. Fla. C.R.C., Proposal 132. The proposal created a new § 23 in article I with two
subsections: (a) Every individual has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into his private life. (b) The legislature shall protect by law the private lives of the
people from intrusion by other persons. See Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Election Com-
mittee Minutes 4-5 (Nov. 21, 1977).
258. Since the federal constitutional right of privacy is an aspect of the liberty protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, only state interference with the right
is restricted. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
259. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 31-32 (Mar. 7, 1978) (remarks of Don Reed).
260. Id. at 21-23 (remarks of William Birchfield and Don Reed); id. at 27-28 (remarks of
William James); id. at 189 (remarks of Don Reed).
261. Id. at 190-91 (remarks of Jan Platt and Don Reed).
262. Id. at 21-23 (remarks of William Birchfield and Don Reed).
263. Initially, Proposal 132 was approved by a vote of 30-5. 16 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 257 (Jan.
9, 1978). Subsequently, the commission defeated a substitute amendment offered by James
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The other major dispute involved the value and importance to be
afforded the right to be let alone. By what standard are Florida
courts to resolve conflicts between governmental action and the
right to be let alone? Is the newly recognized right a fundamental
one, of the same stature as the rights of speech, press, assembly, and
religion, thus requiring a substantial justification for government
action infringing upon it? Or, is the right less important in the
hierarchy of our values and thus subject to infringement by govern-
ment on a less demanding demonstration of need?
The first formulation of the right considered by the committee
addressed the judicial standard question directly. It stated: "The
right of the people to privacy is essential to the well-being of a free
society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compel-
ling state interest." ' 4 Although the drafter intended the
"compelling state interest" language to signal to the courts the great
importance of the right,25 Douglass maintained that the language
would be viewed by the courts as an invitation to diminish the value
of the right.211 While not sharing Douglass' view, D'Alemberte wor-
ried that its use in connection with the right of privacy and not other
rights could lead to a diminution of those other rights.267 Faced with
Douglass' vehement opposition to the language and D'Alemberte's
concern about its possible effect on other rights, the compelling
state interest language was abandoned and did not appear in any
of the succeeding drafts of the proposal.2 11
to delete the substance of Proposal 132 from Proposal 258. 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 525 (Mar. 7,
1978). Don Reed then offered substitute amend. 2 for amend. 5, which deleted subsection (b),
the private intrusion provision. Substitute amend. 2 for amend. 5 was adopted by a vote of
23-8. Id. at 526. A motion to reconsider the vote by which this substitute amendment was
adopted was approved by a vote of 19-15 later that day, id. at 532, and on reconsideration
the substitute amendment failed by a vote of 17-16. Id. Since 19 votes were necessary to
amend Proposal 258, subsection (b) was reinstated. Id. Still later that same day, the commis-
sion voted 20-15 to reconsider the vote by which substitute amend. 2 for amend. 5 failed. Id.
at 534. The substitute amendment was taken up by the commission again and finally ap-
proved by a vote of 20-14. 28 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 536-37 (Mar. 8, 1978). Thus, the private
intrusion provision does not appear in Proposal 258.
264. This was the formulation recommended by Gerald Cope. See Fla. C.R.C., Ethics,
Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 4 (Oct. 5, 1977); Toward a Right of Privacy, supra
note 247, at 739.
265. See Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 4 (Oct. 5, 1977);
Toward A Right of Privacy, supra note 247, at 739-40.
266. Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 3 (Oct. 14, 1977).
267. Id. at 2-3.
268. The author prepared eight different formulations of the right for the committee's
consideration at its Oct. 19, 1977 meeting. The language approved by the committee at its
Nov. 21, 1977 meeting was suggested by a memorandum submitted by the author to the
committee at that meeting. Memorandum from Patricia Dore to Ethics, Privacy and Elec-
tions Committee, re: Privacy, Open Meetings and Public Records (Nov. 21, 1977).
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Also bearing on the question of the value and importance of the
newly recognized right was an effort to restrict the right by protect-
ing against only "unwarranted" intrusion by the government. Col-
lins and Overton were the main proponents of this position, which
was rejected three times by the committee."' They renewed the
effort and were joined by Shevin when Proposal 132 went to the
floor. In presenting the proposal, Moyle explained that the right to
be let alone was entitled to the "same dignity and same importance
as the rights of free press, free speech, religious belief, and associa-
tion. ' '270 But it was in the context of debating and voting on whether
"unwarranted" should be inserted to modify "intrusion" that the
commission itself spoke to the fundamental nature of the right.27'
Those in favor of qualifying the right argued that approving the
proposal as recommended by the committee would result in the
The written record does not account for the dramatic change in emphasis between the
proposal left pending at the Oct. 19, 1977 meeting and the proposal approved at the Nov. 21,
1977 meeting. Between those two meetings, countless hours were spent in an effort to resolve
a dispute and to avert a floor fight that potentially would have endangered passage of any
proposal relating to privacy. The principal actors in the development of the right to be let
alone were D'Alemberte and Douglass. If the language expressing the right were acceptable
to both of them, a formidable alliance would be forged, thus easing the proposal's passage.
The two were in agreement on three points: (1) that the compelling state interest language
was not appropriate; (2) that the likelihood of an independent construction by the state courts
would be increased if the language used did not mimic the federal right (hence the phrase
"right to be let alone" rather than "right of privacy" was preferred); and (3) that the right
was fundamental and therefore ought to be stated in absolute terms and ought not be quali-
fied by "unwarranted." They adamantly disagreed on extending the right to include intrusion
by private persons, with Douglass favoring the extension and D'Alemberte opposing it.
The suggestion that a self-executing right to be free from governmental intrusion be located
in article I and a policy statement against private intrusion to be implemented by the legisla-
ture be placed in article II was offered as a compromise. D'Alemberte was agreeable. Douglass
was willing to accept the policy statement but insisted that it be in article I. The committee
backed Douglass and sent Proposal 132 to the floor, recommending the creation of a new
section in article I containing two subsections: (a) governmental intrusion and (b) private
intrusion.
The D'Alemberte-Douglass alliance remained firm on the absolute statement of the right
against governmental intrusion and that aspect of Proposal 132 emerged intact as a result.
They fought each other long and hard on the private intrusion section, as the saga of substi-
tute amendment 2 for amendment 5 to Proposal 258 (recounted in note 263 supra) illustrates.
In the end, D'Alemberte prevailed.
269. Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 8 (Oct. 19, 1977); id.
at 4-5 (Nov. 21, 1977).
270. 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 7 (Jan. 9, 1978).
271. Several amendments were introduced to insert "unwarranted" into the proposal.
Collins and Overton offered amendment 1 to Proposal 132. The amendment failed by a vote
of 11-24. 16 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 256 (Jan. 9, 1978). Collins, Overton, and Shevin offered amend-
ment 14 to Proposal 258. The amendment was adopted by a vote of 19-14. 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour.
526 (Mar. 7, 1978). Barkdull moved to reconsider the vote by which amendment 14 was
adopted. By a vote of 23-12, the commission agreed to reconsider and then defeated amend-
ment 14 by a vote of 11-24. 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 531 (Mar. 7, 1978).
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invalidation of statutes and court rules which now authorize intru-
sion by government into people's private lives and might result in
judicial interpretations not considered by the commission. Shevin
suggested that statutes authorizing electronic surveillance of organ-
ized crime activities would be void,27 2 while Collins worried about
the proposal's impact on statutes requiring agricultural and other
inspections2 3 and on court rules concerning discovery. 21 Overton
argued that, unless qualified, the right might lead to a ruling that
smoking marijuana in one's home could not be punished. 75 Overton
also feared that the proposal might displace a decision of the Florida
Supreme Court that there was no cause of action for an invasion of
privacy tort when a newspaper published a picture, taken by a news
photographer invited onto the premises by the fire marshal, which
showed the outline of a body. 26 Collins' and Shevin's basic concern
seemed to be the extent to which the police power would be re-
stricted if the right to be let alone were not qualified.2 77 The appro-
priate parallel, according to Collins, was the freedom from unrea-
sonable search and seizure. The people, he argued, are not protected
from all searches and seizures but only from unreasonable ones.
Similarly, the people should not be protected from all governmental
intrusions, only unwarranted ones.
The major opponents, in the committee and on the floor, of quali-
fying the right were Douglass and Moyle. According to Douglass, the
word "unwarranted" was "a weasel word to afford to the courts the
opportunity to dilute an important right that everybody thinks they
have . . . anyway. 279 Both Moyle and Douglass argued that, al-
though stated in unqualified terms, the right to be let alone was not
272. 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 42 (Jan. 9, 1978).
273. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 10-13 (Mar. 7, 1978).
274. 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 40 (Jan. 9, 1978). See also dialogue between
Shevin and Douglass regarding the potential impact on discovery, id. at 68-69, and dialogue
between Collins and Moyle, id. at 73-74.
275. Id. at 35. Overton was referring to an Alaska decision holding that prosecution for
smoking marijuana in the privacy of one's own home was barred by that state's constitutional
right of privacy provision. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975); see Transcript of Fla.
C.R.C. proceedings 25-26 (Mar. 7, 1978) (remarks of Ben Overton). See also Toward a Right
of Privacy, supra note 247 at 694-96.
276. 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 35-36 (Jan. 9, 1978). The decision referred
to is Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976). See also Transcript of
Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 26 (Mar. 7, 1978).
277. See generally 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 39-42 (Jan. 9, 1978) (remarks
of LeRoy Collins); id. at 42-45 (remarks of Robert Shevin); Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. pro-
ceedings 10-16 (Mar. 7, 1978) (remarks by LeRoy Collins); id. at 37 (remarks of Robert
Shevin).
278. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 40-41 (Mar. 7, 1978) (remarks of LeRoy Col-
lins).
279. 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 37 (Jan. 9, 1978).
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an absolute. If government action were challenged as violative of the
right, it would be for the courts, by balancing the interests asserted
by the government against the right of the individual, to determine
whether the right had in fact been infringed. s8 The important point,
they argued, was the weight to be accorded the right. They rejected
the search and seizure parallel postulated by Collins, preferring
instead to place the right on the same plane with free speech, press,
association, and religion. Moyle argued, for example, that inclusion
of "unwarranted" would dilute the importance of the right. In his
view, it was as unacceptable to protect only against unwarranted
intrusion as it would be to guarantee a right to speak reasonably or
to enjoy reasonable religious freedom.2"'
Throughout the debate on the privacy proposal in the committee
and on the floor, the commissioners were concerned about preserv-
ing the so-called Sunshine Amendment in article II, section 8.282
Mathews offered an amendment to Proposal 132 which addressed
the problem directly.2u His purpose, he explained, was "to call at-
tention to an inconsistency that. . . is built in unless you somehow
or another resolve it .... 211 Commissioner Lew Brantley objected
to the Mathews amendment, saying that it would prevent the legis-
lature from extending the financial disclosure requirements of arti-
cle II, section 8 to cover other categories of persons. 21 Plante and
Moyle then offered a substitute amendment, which Mathews agreed
did "the same thing, perhaps in a better way, than my amendment
280. Id. at 23-25, 37-39, 66-67, 69-70 (remarks of Dexter Douglass); id. at 31-33, 48-49,
and Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 25, 38-40 (Mar. 7, 1978) (remarks of Jon Moyle).
See also 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 45-47 (Jan. 9, 1978) (remarks of J.B.
Spence). °
281. 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 49 (Jan. 9, 1978); Transcript of Fla. C.R.C.
proceedings 19, 23-25 (Mar. 7, 1978) (remarks of Jon Moyle).
282. At one point the committee unanimously approved an amendment to a formulation
of the privacy proposal then before it, see text accompanying note 255 supra, to insert "unless
otherwise provided herein." Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes
8 (Oct. 19, 1977). There was no vote by the committee on that particular formulation. See
text accompanying note 256 supra. There was also some discussion about whether the Sun-
shine Amendment could be saved from an argument that it had been repealed by the later
adopted privacy proposal by adding a rule of construction to that effect in article X. The
matter was not resolved by the committee, and Proposal 132 was reported to the floor without
explicit language designed to preserve the Sunshine Amendment.
283. With the Mathews amendment, subsection (a) of Proposal 132 read: "Every individ-
ual except office holders and candidates as defined in Section 8 of Article II has the right to
be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life." 16 Fla. C.R.C. Jour.
257 (Jan. 9, 1978).
284. 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 51-52 (Jan. 9, 1978). Ware offered an
amendment to the Mathews amendment to make it totally consistent with art. II, § 8.
Ware's amendment, approved on a voice vote, added "officers and employees" to the list
which already included officeholders and candidates. Id. at 53.
285. Id. at 54-55.
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[did]." 2I Without further debate, the substitute amendment was
adopted on a voice vote."8 7
As this debate demonstrated, the commission faced the obvious
conflict between the right to be let alone and the financial disclosure
requirements of the Sunshine Amendment. It resolved that conflict
in favor of the Sunshine Amendment. The language "except as
provided herein" was designed solely to preserve the Sunshine
Amendment.
Other potential conflicts were recognized and raised during de-
bate on Proposal 132. For example, some commissioners wondered
whether approval of the proposal would impliedly repeal section 12
so that the people would now have a right to be secure against all
searches and seizures and not only unreasonable ones. The debate
indicates that the commission believed that questions involving the
validity of searches and seizures would continue to be controlled
largely by section 12.288
One could argue, however, that in particularly close cases con-
cerning the reasonableness of a search, the right to be let alone
might tip the balance and cause a court to hold a search invalid.
Significantly, the commission did not treat article I, section 12 in
the same way it treated article II, section 8. That is, while it gener-
ally was understood that search and seizure questions would not be
affected by Proposal 132, the record reflects no intention to fore-
close the possibility that they might be affected. Rather, it left the
issue for judicial resolution, understanding that the competing
interests would have to be balanced.28 And in that process, as
discussed above, the right to be let alone would carry substantial
weight.
With approval of Proposals 137 and 138 relating to public records
and open meetings,10 the commission solved one problem but per-
haps created others. By elevating the public records and open meet-
ing laws to constitutional status, the commission averted the sacri-
fice of Florida's much touted "government in the sunshine" to the
286. Id. at 60. The substitute amendment inserted "except as otherwise provided in this
constitution" before the period in subsection (a). 16 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 257 (Jan. 9, 1978).
287. 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 60-61 (Jan. 9, 1978). The commission sub-
sequently approved the recommendation of the Style and Drafting Committee to delete "in
this constitution" and to substitute "herein." 30 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 570 (Apr. 14, 1978).
288. 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 15-16 (Jan. 9, 1978) (remarks of Dexter
Douglass); id. at 43-44 (remarks of Dexter Douglass and Robert Shevin).
289. In response to a question from Douglass regarding the relationship between the
proposal and § 12, Shevin stated: "I recognize we will be giving the court a choice between
the interpreting of [Section 12] and this amendment provision and trying to decide which
one prevails." Id. at 44.
290. See text accompanying notes 291-323 infra.
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newly recognized right to be let alone.?' However, the inherent con-
flict between public records and the right to be let alone was not
resolved. Rather, it was moved to a new battleground where both
rights presumably would have equal legal stature. Unlike its treat-
ment of the interrelation between the right and financial disclosure,
the commission did not declare which right was to prevail when the
public's right to know conflicted with the individual's right to be let
alone. Resolution of that conflict was left to the judiciary, as was
the conflict between the government's need to collect information
and the individual's right to keep information private.
E. Open Government
Among the suggestions received by the commission from the pub-
lic for revising article I were two to provide a right for citizen access
to government and governmental decisionmaking.12 The matter was
referred to the Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee.2 3 The
committee's recommendations in the open government area were
developed in the context of its recommendation to recognize a right
to be let alone. The privacy issue and the open government issue
were always discussed together, and the two rights-the public's
right to know and the individual's right to be let alone-were con-
sidered inextricably interwoven. Approval of the right to be let alone
meant that open government proposals also had to be approved in
order to maintain a constitutional balance between the two.94 The
committee reported out to the full commission three proposals relat-
ing to open government. Each is discussed separately below.
1. The Open Meetings Proposal
At its October 19, 1977 meeting, the committee considered four
formulations representing three different approaches to the question
of open meetings. 215 One approach required all meetings conducted
291. See generally Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 240-42, 244-245 (Dec. 8, 1977)
(remarks of Jon Moyle); 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 93, 103-04 (Jan. 9, 1978)
(remarks of Jon Moyle).
292. Suggestions, supra note 54, at 7.
293. Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 2 (Oct. 5, 1977).
294. Id. at 3-5 (Oct. 14, 1977); id. at 6-12 (Oct. 19, 1977); id. at 4-6 (Nov. 21, 1977).
295. The open meetings proposals drafted by the author for committee discussion were:
1. The executive and legislative branches of government shall be open and
accessible to the people unless otherwise provided herein.
2. It shall be the policy of the state that the executive and legislative branches
of government shall be open and accessible to the people. Unless otherwise provided
by law, all meetings of any governmental entity in the state shall be open to the
public at all times.
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by the legislative and executive branches to be open unless the
constitution provided otherwise. Under the present constitution the
only exception to open legislative meetings is for executive sessions
of the senate "when considering appointment to or removal from
public office." 9 A second approach was to state a policy that all
meetings conducted by the executive and legislative branches
should be open but to allow the legislature discretion to close meet-
ings. A third approach also stated a policy of openness and permit-
ted the legislature to make exceptions but established standards to
limit the exercise of legislative discretion. The committee took no
action on these proposals. However, the discussion disclosed a con-
sensus on the following points: (1) that the proposal ought to extend
to all branches of state government and to all levels of government
in the state; (2) that the proposal ought to include only meetings of
two or more persons; and (3) that the proposal ought to permit the
legislature to make exceptions but only in accordance with stated
standards.
At a subsequent meeting, the committee considered two new pro-
posals drafted to implement the consensus achieved earlier."7 The
focus of these proposals differed from the earlier suggestions in that
both recognized a right of access to meetings. The language included
only meetings of collegial public bodies or of persons acting on their
behalf, and it included meetings of all nonjudicial public bodies in
the state.298 Without discussion, the committee approved Proposal
3. It shall be the policy of the state that the executive and legislative branches
of government shall be open and accessible to the people. The Legislature may
provide by law for exemptions to this section where individual privacy or an overrid-
ing governmental purpose exceed the merits of open meetings.
4. It shall be the policy of the state that the executive and legislative branches
of government shall be open and accessible to the people. The legislature may
provide by law for exemptions to this section where such action is essential to
protect important privacy interests or overriding governmental purposes.
Memorandum from Patricia Dore to Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee, re: Privacy,
Open Meetings and Open Records (Oct. 19, 1977).
296. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4(b).
297. The author drafted the following proposals which the committee considered at its
Nov. 21, 1977 meeting:
(1) No person shall be denied access to any meeting at which official acts are
to be taken by any nonjudicial collegial public body in the state or by persons acting
on behalf of such a public body.
(2) No person shall be denied access to any meeting at which official acts are
to be taken by any nonjudicial collegial public body in the state or by persons acting
on behalf of such a public body. The Legislature may exempt meetings by general
law where it is essential to protect privacy interests or overriding governmental
purposes.
Memorandum from Patricia Dore to Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee, re: Privacy,
Open Meetings and Public Records (Nov. 21, 1977).
298. The question of openness in judicial proceedings was addressed in a separate recom-
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137, which guaranteed access to all meetings of nonjudicial public
bodies in the state unless by general law the legislature exempted a
meeting from the openness requirement because closure was essen-
tial to protect privacy interests or overriding governmental inter-
ests.2,,
Several amendments were offered during the floor debate on Pro-
posal 137. Mathews moved an amendment to limit access to public
meetings to persons "during good behavior." This amendment
failed.300 Birchfield offered an amendment striking "nonjudicial"
from the proposal. The sponsors of Proposal 137 resisted Birchfield's
amendment because the committee had approved a separate pro-
posal concerning the judiciary. The Birchfield amendment failed on
a voice vote °.30  Shevin then offered an amendment striking
"[meetings] at which official acts are to be taken" and inserting
"[meetings] at which foreseeable action may be taken. ' 0 2 Shevin's
concern was that, as proposed by the committee, Proposal 137 was
"weaker than the existing Sunshine Law as interpreted by the Flor-
ida Supreme Court." 303 Both Moyle and Douglass assured Shevin
and the other commissioners that the committee did not intend to
weaken the open meetings law. In fact, they stated, the language of
that statute had been used in the proposal so that its judicial inter-
pretations would be incorporated and serve as precedent for inter-
pretation of the constitutional provision °.30 With the uncontradicted
statement of the sponsors on the record to the effect that it was their
intent that the judicial interpretations of the open meetings law be
incorporated and made part of the proposal, Shevin withdrew the
amendment 05
Finally, Shevin offered an amendment to strike "to protect pri-
vacy interests or overriding governmental purposes" and to insert
"to promote compelling governmental interests. ' 306 Shevin ex-
mendation. See notes 324-34 infra and accompanying text.
299. Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 5 (Nov. 21, 1977).
300. 14 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 231 (Dec. 8, 1977).
301. Id. at 232.
302. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 218 (Dec. 8, 1977).
303. Id. at 219.
304. Id. at 219-23 (remarks of Jon Moyle and Dexter Douglass). FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1)
(1977) provides:
All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or of
any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation or any political subdi-
vision, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, at which official acts are
to be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, and
no resolution, rule, regulation, or formal action shall be considered binding except
as taken or made at such meeting.
305. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 223 (Dec. 8, 1977).
306. 14 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 231 (Dec. 8, 1977).
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plained that the amendment was offered because he worried about
the breadth of the "privacy interest" standard. 70 Overton pointed
out the problem of applying the Shevin amendment to a meeting
at which information exempted from the public records law might
be discussed. That meeting might be closed to protect the privacy
of the person being discussed but could not be closed to protect a
compelling governmental interest because there would not be a gov-
ernmental interest involved. 30" The amendment was defeated on a
voice vote.3°
On the first vote, Proposal 137 failed to receive the necessary
votes.310 It was reconsidered, however, and approved without further
debate by a vote of twenty-seven to three.311
2. The Open Records Proposal
At its October 19, 1977 meeting the committee discussed but took
no action on two proposals concerning public records.312 Overton
raised questions about the impact of the proposals on the courts'
307. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 227-28 (Dec. 8, 1977).
308. Id. at 227-28 (remarks of Ben Overton).
309. See 14 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 231 (Dec. 8, 1977).
310. Id. at 232. The vote was 16-15.
311. 16 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 257 (Jan. 9, 1978). The Style and Drafting Committee recom-
mended the following changes: strike "or overriding governmental purposes" and insert after
"essential," "for overriding governmental purposes." Fla. C.R.C., Comm. on Style and Draft-
ing, Report to the Florida Constitution Revision Commission 9 (Mar. 6, 1978). This recom-
mendation was adopted by the commission. 30 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 570 (Apr. 14, 1978). The
Style and Drafting Committee subsequently recommended striking "for" and inserting "to
accomplish." 30 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 555 (Apr. 14, 1978). The commission adopted this recom-
mendation also. Id. at 559. As finally adopted, the proposal reads:
No person shall be denied access to any meeting at which official acts are to be
taken by any nonjudicial collegial public body in the state or by persons acting
together on behalf of such a public body. The legislature may exempt meetings by
general law when it is essential to accomplish overriding governmental purposes or
to protect privacy interests.
Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. I, § 25 (May 11, 1978).
312. The public records proposals drafted for committee discussion were:
1. No person shall be deprived of the right to examine any document made or
received in connection with the public business by any governmental entity in the
state or persons acting on its behalf. The Legislature may exempt documents by
law where it is essential to protect privacy interests or overriding governmental
purposes.
2. No person shall be deprived of the right to examine any document made or
received in connection with the public business by any governmental entity in the
state or persons acting on its behalf. The Legislature may exempt documents from
this section where individual privacy or an overriding governmental purpose exceed
the merits of public disclosure.
Memorandum from Patricia Dore to Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee, re: Privacy,
Open Meetings and Open Records (Oct. 19, 1977).
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needs to seal records and also whether opinions circulating among
appellate court judges would be subject to the openness require-
ments.3 13 Proposal 138, tracking the language of the public records
statute3 1' and excluding the judiciary, was considered and approved
by the committee at its November 21, 1977 meeting.1 Proposal 138
generated little debate on the floor31-and also little enthusiasm. It
failed by a fifteen to fourteen vote.3 1 1
The proposal was reconsidered in January after the commission
approved Proposal 132-the right to be let alone. At that time two
amendments were offered to Proposal 138. Don Reed moved to
strike "nonjudicial" so that the proposal would ensure public access
to all public records. The amendment was resisted by Moyle be-
cause access to judicial records was addressed by the committee in
a separate proposal. Reed's amendment failed on a voice vote. t 5
Commissioner Nathaniel Polak offered an amendment providing
that the effective date of Proposal 138 would be June 1, 1979.31 The
Polak amendment resulted from debate about the impact of the
proposal on the legislatively created exceptions to the current public
records statute. Overton's statement that those exceptions would be
grandfathered in320 was contradicted by Moyle and Douglass.32 1 The
commission agreed to the delayed effective date so as to give the
legislature an opportunity to review the exceptions it had created
and to determine whether those exceptions were warranted in light
313. Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 9-10 (Oct. 19, 1977).
314. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(1) (1977) defines public records as "all documents, papers,
letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings or other material, regard-
less of physical form or characteristics, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in
connection with the transaction of official business by any agency." FLA. STAT. § 119.011(2)
(1977) defines agency as "any state, county, district, authority, or municipal officer, depart-
ment, division, board, bureau, commission, or other separate unit of government created or
established by law and any other public or private agency, person, partnership, corporation,
or business entity acting on behalf of any public agency."
315. Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 5 (Nov. 21, 1977).
As approved by the committee, Proposal 138 provided:
No person shall be denied the right to examine any public record made or re-
ceived in connection with the public business by any nonjudicial public officer or
employee in the state or by persons acting on their behalf. The Legislature may
exempt records by general law where it is essential to protect privacy interests or
overriding governmental purposes.
Id.
316. See Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 239-46 (Dec. 8, 1977).
317. 14 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 232 (Dec. 8, 1977).
318. 16 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 257 (Jan. 9, 1978).
319. Id.
320. 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 96 (Jan. 9, 1978).
321. Id. at 96-97 (remarks of Jon Moyle); id. at 99 (remarks of Dexter Douglass).
19781
662 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:609
of the standards established by Proposal 138.322 Without further
debate or amendment, Proposal 138 was approved twenty-one to
eleven .3
3. The Open Judiciary Proposal
As the discussion concerning the public records and open meet-
ings proposals indicated, the committee determined that the special
needs of the judiciary warranted a separate proposal relating to the
openness of judicial proceedings and records. The committee con-
sidered two proposals at its November 21, 1977 meeting.24 One ad-
dressed openness of judicial proceedings and records; 325 the other
addressed openness of judicial proceedings and records and also the
proceedings and records of so-called "judicial agencies" such as The
Florida Bar.3 12 The committee discussion of the proposals indicated
the members' understanding that the word "proceedings" did not
include the conferences of appellate judges or the deliberations of
petit juries. The committee also was aware that neither proposal
addressed the secrecy of proceedings of the Judicial Qualifications
322. Id. at 99-100 (remarks of Robert Shevin and Dexter Douglass); see 16 Fla. C.R.C.
Jour. 257 (Jan. 9, 1978).
323. 16 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 257-58 (Jan. 9, 1978). The Style and Drafting Committee recom-
mended the following changes: strike "or overriding governmental purposes"; strike, "where"
and insert "when" and after "essential," insert "for overriding governmental purposes." Fla.
C.R.C., Comm. on Style and Drafting, Report to the Florida Constitution Revision Commis-
sion 9 (Mar. 6,1978). The recommendations were approved by the commission. 30 Fla. C.R.C.
Jour. 570 (Apr. 14, 1978).
The Style and Drafting Committee subsequently recommended striking "for" and inserting
"to accomplish," and striking "their" and inserting "the officer's or employee's." Id. at 555.
The commission approved these recommendations. Id. at 559. As finally adopted, the pro-
posal reads:
No person shall be denied the right to examine any public record made or re-
ceived in connection with the public business by any nonjudicial public officer or
employee in the state or by persons acting on the officer's or employee's behalf. The
legislature may exempt records by general law when it is essential to accomplish
overriding governmental purposes or to protect privacy interests.
Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. I, § 24 (May 11, 1978).
324. See Memorandum from Patricia Dore to Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee,
re: Privacy, Open Meetings and Public Records (Nov. 21, 1977).
325. "All judicial proceedings and records shall be open and accessible to the people.
Where it is essential to protect privacy interests or overriding governmental purposes, the
supreme court by rule or the legislature by general law may exempt proceedings and records
from this section." Id. at 3.
326. All judicial proceedings and records and all proceedings and records of
judicial agencies shall be open and accessible to the people. Where it is essential
to protect privacy interests or overriding governmental purposes, the supreme court
by rule or the legislature by general law may exempt proceedings and records from
this section.
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Commission.32 7 The committee voted to recommend adoption of the
second proposal, which required openness for judicial proceedings
and records and also for the proceedings and records of "judicial
agencies."1321
This proposal, number 133, was presented to the commission with
the explanation that it would not affect appellate court conferences
or petit jury deliberations but that it would require that grand jury
proceedings be open unless closed by rule or by statute.2 9 On motion
by Barkdull, Proposal 133 was referred back to committee for clarifi-
cation.330 A subcommittee comprised of Overton and Douglass rec-
ommended, and the commission adopted, an amendment which
expressly excluded grand and petit juries from the proposal and
restricted the openness requirement to judicial "hearings" as op-
posed to "proceedings.'ml Douglass, Spence, and Birchfield spon-
sored an amendment deleting the language in article V, section
12(d) which required confidentiality of Judicial Qualifications Com-
mission proceedings until formal charges are filed.3 2 Their amend-
ment passed. 33 Without further amendment or debate, Proposal 133
was adopted by a vote of twenty-five to zero. 4
Commission debate on two other proposals also related to open
proceedings and records. Proposal 67 by the Committee on the Judi-
ciary, relating to the judicial nominating commissions, was
327. Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 6 (Nov. 21, 1977).
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(d) expressly provides that J.Q.C. proceedings are confidential until
formal charges are filed with the clerk of the supreme court.
328. Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 6 (Nov. 21, 1977).
329. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 120-24 (Dec. 8, 1977).
330. Id. at 125.
331. 20 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 310 (Jan. 13, 1978).
332. Id. at 311.
333. Id.
334. The proposal was reconsidered and further amended by inserting the word
"hearings" to make clear that hearings, proceedings, and records could be exempted by rule
or general law. 22 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 331 (Jan. 24, 1978). The Style and Drafting Committee
recommended, and the commission approved, the same changes in the last sentence as had
been recommended and approved for Proposals 137 and 138. Fla. C.R.C., Comm. on Style
and Drafting, Report to the Florida Constitution Revision Commission 9 (Mar. 6, 1978); 30
Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 555, 559, 570 (Apr. 14, 1978); see notes 311, 323 supra. Barkdull offered
amend. 5 to Proposal 258, which reinserted the language in art. V, § 12(d) stricken by
commission approval of the amendment offered by Douglass, Spence, and Birchfield. Amend-
ment 5 was adopted. 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 533 (Mar. 7, 1978). As finally approved by the
commission, Proposal 133, amending art. V, § 1, reads:
All judicial hearings and records and all proceedings and records of judicial
agencies except grand and petit juries shall be open and accessible to the people.
When it is essential to accomplish overriding governmental purposes or to protect
privacy interests, the supreme court by rule or the legislature by general law may
exempt hearings, proceedings and records from this section.
Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. V, § 1 (May 11, 1978).
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amended on the floor to require all proceedings and records of the
commissions to be open and accessible to the public.33 Subse-
quently, Overton and others introduced Proposal 215, which also
concerned the judicial nominating commissions. The purpose of the
proposal was to replace the previously adopted Proposal 67 and to
conform the language as it related to openness and accessibility with
that in Proposals 137 and 138.13 Some objection was raised about
the need to deal with the openness of the nominating commissions
in a separate proposal. Moyle argued that these commissions were
already covered by Proposals 137 and 138, if the commissions were
nonjudicial, and would be covered by Proposal 133 if they were
judicial agencies . 37 Since the judicial nominating commissions ap-
peared to be neither fish nor fowl,35 the commission approved Pro-
posal 215, specifically subjecting the nominating commissions to the
constitutional requirement of openness.35
The four proposals relating to public accessibility to government
processes and records all share two important characteristics. First
is the premise that the public's business ought to be conducted in
the sunshine. The commission recommended elevation of the open
meetings and public records statutes to constitutional status in part
because of its decision to recommend recognition of a right to be let
alone by government. But the commission also was responding to
the concerns of those who worried that Florida's nationally recog-
335. 10 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 185 (Nov. 21, 1977). Approval of this amendment by
D'Alemberte and John Moore was the commission's first expression regarding openness and
accessibility of records and proceedings. Proposals 133, 137, and 138 did not come to the floor
until December. See notes 300, 316, 329 supra.
336. Transcript of C.R.C. proceedings 140-42 (Jan. 13, 1978) (remarks of Ben Overton).
Actually, the language in Proposal 215 did not parallel that in Proposals 137 and 138. Proposal
215 provided in part: "The supreme court may by rule exempt portions of the proceedings
and records from this provision where it is essential to obtain information pertaining to
applicants or to protect privacy interests or overriding governmental purposes." The Style
and Drafting Committee recommended, and the commission approved, deletion of the lan-
guage "to obtain information pertaining to applicants or," Fla. C.R.C., Style and Drafting
Committee Minutes 18 (Feb. 14, 15, 16, 1978); 30 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 570 (Apr. 14, 1978). The
Style and Drafting Committee recommended, and the commission approved, the same
changes in the last sentence as had been recommended and approved for Proposals 133, 137,
and 138. Fla. C.R.C., Comm. on Style and Drafting, Report to the Florida Constitution
Revision Commission 54 (Mar. 6, 1978); 30 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 555, 559, 570, (Apr. 14, 1978);
see notes 311, 323, 334 supra.
337. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 160-63 (Jan. 13, 1978).
338. The uncertain status of the judicial nominating commissions results from an advisory
opinion to the Governor in which the court said: "While the function of the commissions is
inherently executive in nature, the mandate for the commissions comes from the people and
the Constitution, not from the Legislature, the Governor, or the Courts." In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor, 276 So. 2d 25, 30 (Fla. 1973).
339. 20 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 310 (Jan. 13, 1978).
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nized devotion to "government in the sunshine" was slowly eroding,
as well as to those who maintained that the public's right to know
was a principle of such fundamental importance in a democracy
that it ought to be included in the declaration of rights.
The second characteristic common to the four proposals is a state-
ment of standards against which exceptions to the principle of open-
ness is to be tested. A constitutional requirement that all meetings,
hearings, proceedings, and records be open and accessible to the
public was viewed as unworkable and potentially harmful to both
private citizens and the government. Neither the open meetings nor
the public records statutes provide for public accessibility at all
times and under all circumstances. In fact, the commission was told
that presently there are more than 150 exceptions to the public
records law. While it was agreed that most of the legislatively cre-
ated exceptions probably were appropriate, that circumstance was
viewed as a happy coincidence owing to the legislature's historical
acceptance of the sunshine concept. Rather than trust to accident
and unbridled legislative discretion the principle of public access to
public business, the commission elected to recommend the estab-
lishment of criteria by which the legislature and ultimately the
courts could judge exceptions to open government.
Exceptions to the principle of openness may be provided only
when the exception is "essential to accomplish overriding govern-
mental purposes or to protect privacy interests." 340 These cri-
teria-overriding governmental purposes and privacy interests-are
broad statements of principle befitting constitutional provisions. No
attempt was made by the commission to define or delimit them.
However, that is not to suggest that they are without meaning or
that they have no content. On the contrary, the phrase "essential
to accomplish overriding governmental purposes" was derived from
a series of United States Supreme Court decisions .34 The phrase is
an integral part of the so-called "compelling state interest" stan-
dard of judicial review. In order for legislation to pass constitutional
muster under this standard of review, the government has the bur-
den of demonstrating that the challenged legislation serves an over-
riding or compelling purpose and that the means selected are essen-
340. See Fla. C.R.C., Proposals 133, 137, 138, 215.
341. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Supreme Court has used "overriding," "compelling,"
"important," and "substantial" to characterize the state interest. However, it attaches "no
particular significance to these variations in diction." In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 n.9
(1973).
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tial or necessary to achieve that overriding or compelling purpose.
Put another way, if less drastic means are available to the govern-
ment through which it can achieve that interest of overriding im-
portance, the means selected are not essential and the legislation
fails to satisfy the- standard.
The phrase "to protect privacy interests" has no similar deriva-
tive or federal constitutional history. However, when it is read in its
context, "essential to protect privacy interests," the same analysis
suggested above applies. The legislature may provide an exception
to the public records provision regarding, for example, personal
medical records. In order to sustain the legitimacy of that exception,
the state would have the burden of proving that the exception
granted by the legislature was essential to protect privacy interests
and that no less drastic alternative was available to protect those
interests.
While the decisions give some indication as to the meaning of
"overriding governmental interests,""34 the phrase "privacy inter-
ests" is potentially very broad indeed. It is certainly not coextensive
with nor as limited as the newly recognized right to be let alone.
Although the "right of privacy" language is in the title to the section
and is used as a kind of shorthand for the right to be let alone, the
word "privacy" nowhere appears in the language expressing the
right. Certainly, the phrase "privacy interests" picks up whatever
is protected by the right to be let alone. However, the phrase is
broader in scope than is the right and is more comprehensive in its
application since the right to be let alone pertains only to natural
persons.343 Beyond that, it will be for the courts to determine
whether an asserted governmental interest is overriding, what pri-
vacy interests are, and whether, in either event, those interests
could have been protected or accomplished by a means less drastic
than closure to the public.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the organizational sessions in July, 1977, the members of the
Constitution Revision Commission listened as high-ranking public
figures-some of them members of the 1965 Commission-proffered
advice on the proper approach to constitution-making.3 " The advice
342. See, e.g., cases cited in note 341 supra.
343. The summary prepared by the revision commission staff notes that exemptions may
be made when it "is essential to protect privacy interests of a person or business . . . " Fla.
C.R.C., Proposed Revision of the Florida Constitution 2 (1978) (emphasis added) (staff sum-
maries of proposed changes).
344. The following persons addressed the commission: Governor Reubin Askew, Tran-
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offered was not always consistent. Former Governor Millard Cald-
well, for example, believing that the time was not right for writing
a constitution, told the commission to "meet, organize, adjourn sine
die and go home. '345 In contrast, the chairman of the previous com-
mission, Chesterfield Smith, urged the commission to be expansive
in its view of the task ahead and to consider revising the declaration
of rights to "address and embrace the quality of life to the extent
that Floridians have come . . to understand to be their minimum
entitlement." 346
The commission's response in the following months, at least inso-
far as the declaration of rights was concerned, fell somewhere be-
tween Caldwell's entreaty to do nothing and Smith's call to do a
great deal. Indeed, the proposed revision of article I could be viewed
as embodying the spirit of Governor Reubin Askew's initial message
to the commission:
Do not hesitate to be bold. But also do not hesitate to be cau-
tious. "Your greatest challenge will be to discern the difference
between needed reform and necessary restraint-to preserve the
strengths of the past even as you seek to perceive the spirit of the
future."
...Constitutional change is a continuing process, a continuing
challenge-much like life itself.
... [C]hange comes hard, ... reform comes slowly, often
much too slowly. But we ...know that reforms which are really
needed can be achieved in time-with the help of the people. '
Quite significantly, the commission did "preserve the strengths of
the past" by reaffirming the freedoms already secured by the state
constitution. As Askew also reminded the commissioners, however,
"constitutional change is a continuing process." And recognition of
new freedoms is an evolving process. The commission's rejection of
proposals relating to the rights of the mentally handicapped, the
script of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 15 (July 6, 1977); Chief Justice Ben Overton, id. at 19;
Senate President Lew Brantley, id. at 25; House Speaker Donald Tucker, id. at 26; 1965
Revision Commission Chairman Chesterfield Smith, id. at 31; Commissioner of Education
Ralph Turlington, Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 6 (July 7, 1977); former Governor
Millard Caldwell, id. at 28; former commissioner and President of Florida AFL-CIO Charlie
Harris, id. at 33; former Commissioner Warren Goodrich, id. at 41; former Commissioner Joe
Jacobs, id. at 46.
345. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 28 (July 7, 1977) (remarks of Millard Cald-
well).
346. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
347. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 18 (July 6, 1977) (remarks of Governor Reubin
Askew).
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right to a clean and healthful environment, the right to jury trial in
juvenile proceedings, and a standard of liability in defamation cases
more favorable to the publisher could be viewed as a rejection of the
principles encompassed by those proposals. With the possible ex-
ception of the right to a clean environment, however, these rejected
proposals represented comparatively recent ideas making their ini-
tial bid for constitutional recognition. 48 If basic human rights are
viewed as evolving over time, the commission's inaction in these
areas could reflect a belief that the time simply has not yet arrived
to incorporate these concepts into the state's basic charter.
In its assessment of the needs of the future, the commission was
at once bold and cautious. It recommended that Florida become the
fourth state to recognize, as a freestanding right, the right to be let
alone34' and only the second state to guarantee constitutionally pub-
lic access to public records and public meetings.3" However, neither
notion is new for Floridians. The constitution was amended in 1968
to prohibit the "unreasonable interception of private communica-
tions";1' access to public records was established as state policy in
1909; 351 and the open meetings statute was first enacted in 1967.3
Similarly, transactional immunity, while a new state constitu-
tional right, has been required by statute in this state for the past
seventy-three years .35 In addition, the right to counsel in grand jury
proceedings is recognized by ten states and has been endorsed by
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association .355 Likewise,
Florida's current constitutional provision on bail and the imple-
menting court rules have been the subject of litigation in the federal
courts for the past decade. The commission's recommendation on
bail marks another step in the gradual expansion of the right to be
at liberty pending adjudication of guilt.
It remains to be seen whether the people of Florida are willing to
support the commission's boldly cautious perception of the future.
348. The first major United States Supreme Court decision concerning the rights of per-
sons involuntarily confined in mental institutions was in 1975. O'Conner v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975). Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) was only recently
overruled by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Jury trial in juvenile proceed-
ings was not rejected by the Supreme Court until 1971. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971).
349. See Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 247, at 692.
350. See MoNT. CONST. art. 11, § 9.
351. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; see Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 247, at 721-24.
352. Ch. 5942, 1909 Fla. Laws 132.
353. Ch. 67-356, 1967 Fla. Laws 1147 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1977)).
354. See text accompanying note 158 supra; Florida Grand Jury: Abolition or Reform?,
supra note 155, at 859.
355. See Florida Grand Jury, supra note 155, at 850-51.
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But if Governor Askew is correct, we can say with some assurance
that the reforms which are really needed will be achieved in
time-with the help of the people.

